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Abstract 
This thesis investigates performance and other characteristics of zombie funds in the 
global private equity market using a dataset from Preqin. Our sample comprises a 
total of 4 204 private equity funds with vintage years from 2003 to 2008. We find that 
zombie funds constitute a substantial part of the global private equity market as we 
identify 1 274 zombie funds in our sample. Using IRR and TVPI to measure 
performance, we find that zombie funds underperform other private equity funds. 
Furthermore, by looking at DPI, we find that zombie funds distribute less capital back 
to investors than non-zombie funds. This thesis is based on interim performance 
measures. We moreover examine whether different fund characteristics display 
significant relationships to zombie funds. We find that zombie funds tend to be small 
and report performance data less frequently compared to other private equity funds.  
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1. Introduction 
We will begin by presenting the background and motivation of this thesis, before we 
explain the topic and research question. The last part of this section will provide an 
overview of the thesis structure. 
 
1.1 Topic and Research Question 
Recent news articles and industry research highlights a dark side of the private equity 
industry, where funds raised several years ago are slowly becoming the ‘living dead’. 
Having no clear plans for raising a successor fund, these zombie funds hold on to 
assets to keep the funds alive. Even with low hopes of profiting from the remaining 
assets, they hold on to investments simply to collect management fees. These funds 
might end up destroying value and create problems for all parties involved. In 2013, 
Preqin (2013a) identified about 1 200 potential zombie funds and reported that as 
much as $ 116 bn could be trapped in such funds globally. Furthermore, these funds 
are growing in numbers following the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Consequently, 
both the private equity industry and the authorities have become aware of the 
potential problems posed by zombie funds. Financial authorities in the U.K. and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission of the U.S. have launched investigations of 
such funds. Despite the increased awareness of private equity zombie funds, research 
on this topic is limited.  
 
Based on the growing concern for and lack of empirical research on zombie funds, we 
wish to provide some insight on this topic. Specifically, we wish to test whether 
zombie funds underperform other private equity funds and if they display different 
fund characteristics. We will explore the global private equity market, which gives us 
the following research question: 
 
“Do zombie fund performance and characteristics differ from those of other private 
equity funds globally?” 
 
1.2 Thesis Structure 
In the first and introductory chapter we explain the choice of topic, the motivation for 
the thesis and the research question, before we present the thesis structure. In chapter 
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2, we give a general description of private equity, the development of this market's 
history, private equity fund types, and zombie funds. Chapter 3 looks at agency 
theory in private equity. This section lists potential agency problems within private 
equity and zombie funds, and gives possible solutions for investors and investees. 
Chapter 4 presents theory on diversification and performance in private equity. We 
here explain the most common return measures used for this industry, and the 
possible strengths and weaknesses linked to each measure. Chapter 5 outlines 
previous research related to our topic. In chapter 6 we present the methodology of the 
thesis where research design, data, reliability and validity, potential biases and 
methods of analysis are explained. Characteristics and returns of zombie funds are 
examined in chapter 7, which are further compared to those of other private equity 
funds. Chapter 8 covers the empirical analysis where we test for the significance of 
characteristics and performance of zombie funds in comparison to non-zombie funds. 
Finally, chapter 9 summarizes the thesis with a conclusion and suggestions for 
further research.    
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2. What is Private Equity? 
Private Equity (PE) is a form of equity consisting of investors and funds that make 
investments directly into private portfolio companies not listed on a stock exchange. 
These types of investments are characterized especially by active ownership. Active 
ownership entails that the private equity companies work closely with the 
management of the acquired portfolio companies to create value by contributing 
capital and complementary expertise. Private equity funds invest in companies that 
cover the entire spectrum from startups to mature businesses, and the type of expertise 
provided depends on what stage and industry the acquired company operates in. There 
are two broad categories of private equity funds: buyout funds (BO) and venture-
capital funds (VC). A buyout fund acquires shares in an established company, 
whereas a venture-capital fund will co-invest with the entrepreneur in a company at 
an early stage or in a company seeking to expand.  
 
The private equity funds often obtain a majority stake in the portfolio company to 
ensure influence on the board and thus active ownership (Isaksen and Biørnstad, 
2006). This control is achieved so that the strategic measures needed to assure value 
creation can be implemented. Active ownership means that the fund, in addition to 
contributing capital, actively collaborates with the company's board and management 
on its development. The private equity fund will assist the company in strengthening 
management expertise, delivering operational improvements and accessing new 
markets. This participation, however, consumes a lot of time and resources, and so 
private equity funds will usually not have more than 3-5 portfolio companies per 
employee (Nygård and Normann, 2008). To be able to drive this kind of value 
growth, specialized expertise is a prerequisite. BO requires skills in the fields of 
restructuring, strategizing and growth, while for VC abilities within marketing, 
product development and research are of higher priority.  
 
PE funds invest in portfolio companies with high growth and development potential. 
The acquisitions are primarily directed at small to mid-size companies. 80 % of 
companies receiving PE investment in Europe in 2013 had less than 250 employees. 
Even though larger businesses are potential portfolio companies, some are just too 
large to be considered for acquisitions.  
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The aspiration of PE funds is to achieve a positive economic development and cash 
flow growth for their portfolio companies. This is often accomplished through four 
value increasing roles (Jakobsen, 2006): 
1. The funds contribute to economic development through selection of the 
companies that will be invested in.  
2. By supplying capital to the acquired companies, funds provide an opportunity 
for further growth and development.  
3. PE funds can contribute complementary resources and expertise that the 
portfolio company does not already possess, through networks and advisory 
services. 
4. The advisory process materializes through active participation in the portfolio 
company's board and through other contact with its management. Strategic 
consultation related to the company's further development might include 
recruitment of key employees and establishing contact with new customers 
and partners. Other examples of management tasks private equity funds may 
perform are raising additional capital and creating good internal routines and 
practices to ensure cooperation at all company levels.  
 
The most widespread organizational structure in the PE industry today is the limited 
partnership, which has grown from accounting for only 40 % of the venture pool of 
capital in 1980 to constitute 80 % of the same pool by 1992 (Mehta, 2004; Gompers 
and Lerner, 1999). PE funds are regularly organized as limited partnerships (LLPs) or 
limited liability companies (LLCs), and not as corporations. The limited partners 
(LPs) passively invest money in PE funds that are actively managed by general 
partners (GPs). The LPs do not participate in the daily operations of the fund, and 
therefore relies on the GPs to make a satisfactory return on investment. Complications 
can emerge as a result of the fact that LPs cannot actively observe the actions of the 
GPs. In order to protect the interests of the LPs and minimize the information 
asymmetry problems that can arise between LPs and GPs, a contract concerning 
compensation and other terms is usually created between the two parties (Mehta, 
2004).   
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The lifespan of a PE fund depends on the purpose of the fund and the type of 
companies it will invest in. A VC fund will consistently have a longer lifetime than a 
BO fund (Nygård and Normann, 2008). Generally, PE funds are ten-year limited 
partnerships (EVCA, 2012). These ten years plus a two-year potential extension 
period is the usual maximum fund lifespan. This means that LPs commit their capital 
for a long time, thus PE investments are considered to be illiquid. What distinguish a 
PE investment from other equity investments are the opportunities for committing 
additional capital and exit. In mutual open-end funds investors have a continuing 
opportunity for committing more capital and for exiting the investment. In a PE fund, 
however, the fund will close for further committed capital once the target capital is 
raised, as these are closed-end funds. The investor has the option to trade his shares in 
a secondary market during the life of the fund. However, estimating the value of this 
share is difficult, and so investors cannot trade in and out easily. The long 
commitment of high volumes of capital results in institutional investors being the 
primary investor in PE. In 2013, pension funds provided almost 40 % of the total 
global fundraising of the industry. Funds of funds contributed 16 %, while sovereign 
wealth funds and insurance companies both provided 11 % the same year (EVCA, 
2013).  
 
Various exit strategies are present at the end of the fund investment period. The most 
widely used exit routes are initial public offerings (IPOs), trade sales or mergers, 
secondary sales to another GP, restructuring, recapitalization and sales directly to the 
management of the portfolio company (Preqin, 2011). In an IPO, the company's 
shares are listed on a stock exchange for the first time, and the investor will be able to 
sell shares to the public. A trade sale involves selling all shares of the company to a 
third party where said party often is a firm operating in the same industry as the 
company sold. In a secondary sale a PE investor sells the company to another PE 
firm. Recapitalization entails re-leveraging the company and using the proceeds to 
repurchase the company's own shares from the investor. In 2011, the most frequently 
observed exit type was trade sales, followed by IPOs (Preqin, 2011).  
 
PE managers are compensated through four main sources of revenue, namely 
management fees, carried interest, deal fees and monitoring fees (Migliorini, 2014). 
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Management fees cover all expenses incurred by the PE fund and include salaries, 
operating costs and the cost of monitoring portfolio companies. This fee is the GPs 
primary source of income and usually range from 1,3 % to 2,5 % of committed capital 
during the investment period. Carried interest serve as a performance fee, and is 
generally equal to 20 % of the capital gains realized from the investments of the fund. 
A hurdle rate, of typically 8 %, must be reached before the carried interest is paid the 
to GPs. Every time a GP executes an acquisition or exit it may charge a deal fee. This 
fee is typically between 0,5 % and 1,5 % of the deal's equity or enterprise value. A 
few years ago, LPs started to put more pressure on GPs to improve their fee structure, 
thus deal fees are not common practice today. Many GPs charge a monitoring fee 
once an investment is made. The portfolio company pays this fee to the GPs for 
consulting and advisory services (Migliorini, 2014).  
 
2.1 Private Equity History 
Historically, the U.S. has been the largest PE market worldwide and is usually viewed 
as the founder of the modern PE. Several early establishments helped the 
development of the U.S. as the PE industry leader. The War Finance Corporation was 
established in 1918, initially to support war-related industries, but later moved on to 
focus on financial backing of agricultural and railroad companies. In 1946, the French 
general Georges Doriot established the American Research and Development 
Corporation (ARD) at Harvard. Since this event, VC has had strong relationships with 
universities in the U.S. A symbol of ARDs several successful investments is the IPO 
of the Digital Equipment Corporation in 1970 - a company later to be a part of the 
merger to form Compaq. With the goal of supporting small businesses, the Small 
Business Administration (SBA) was founded in 1953. Five years later, in 1958, Small 
Businesses Investment Companies (SBIC) was established, which may be regarded as 
the event where modern VC industry was born (Demaria, 2010). 
 
The boom in the stock market during the 1960s gave an additional strength to the 
growth in the VC industry, but PE experienced a slight setback as a consequence of 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in the following decade. The 
government restricted pension funds from taking excessive risk, having an effect on 
PE, which is considered a high-risk investment. However, during the 70s and early 
* 15*
80s VC, measured in million dollars invested, was once again larger than BO. 
Nevertheless, in the late 80s BO experienced a significant growth and eventually 
surpassed VC.  
 
Europeans have tried to copy the U.S. PE model, although with some challenges as 
the culture for entrepreneurship is somewhat different. One obstacle is the 
fragmentation the European market. There may be significant differences in laws (e.g. 
taxes) as well as cultural characteristics that bring along these challenges. Historically 
being risk-averse, there has been a careful approach to entrepreneurship in Europe and 
possibly to the idea of investing in PE funds (Demaria, 2010). A third challenge is 
related to immigration and education. Looking to the U.S., a significant part of the 
startups have been founded by immigrants. For example, 52% of the startups in 
Silicon Valley in 2009 were founded by immigrants (The Economist, 2009b). 
Attracting foreigners to the universities, the U.S. has enhanced the number and quality 
of the startups and thus improved the market conditions for PE.  
 
The U.K. has for a long time been the financial center of Europe and has shown 
tradition for innovation. Building on this and establishing VC vehicles, the U.K. grew 
to be the leading PE market in Europe during the 90s, a position it still holds today 
(Demaria, 2010). Another important effect was the country's similarity to the U.S. in 
terms of language and culture, which made it an attractive position for regional and 
pan-European LBO funds.  
 
Through the tax framework for capital gains, European countries have encouraged 
investors to invest in PE firms. Furthermore, U.K. and France enabled retail investors 
to participate by creating venture capital trusts. Taking the IT crash in the U.S. in 
2000 into consideration, the possibilities of an attractive return over risk significantly 
increased in this period. (Demaria, 2010) 
 
2.2 Different Types of Private Equity Investment 
There are four fundamental types of PE investment at the company level: buyout, 
development capital, growth capital and venture capital (Fraser-Sampson, 2011). 
Which of these groups a PE fund belongs to depends on the type of company in which 
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it invests and at what stage in the product life cycle the company operates. Within 
these main groups, different strategies are used to achieve given targets. In the 
following section, we will give a brief description of the most common fund types, 
namely buyout, venture capital, growth, real estate, infrastructure and fund of funds 
(Preqin, 2015a). In addition, we will look to mezzanine.   
 
2.2.1 Leveraged Buyout 
A buyout fund is a fund with a predominant strategy to acquire controlling stakes in 
an established company. The portfolio companies of a buyout fund are typically 
mature companies exhibiting growth or companies in a restructuring process, who 
generate cash flows from operations on their own. The strategy builds on making 
investments through acquisitions of a company's assets from its current owners by the 
use of interest bearing instruments, such as loans and bonds - hence the name 
leveraged buyout (LBO) (Blaydon and Wainwright, 2006). The ratio of debt to equity 
in an LBO ranges from 60 % to 90 % debt, where the payments of interest and loan 
principal on said debt are secured by the cash flows of the acquired company (Kaplan 
and Strömberg, 2008).  
 
The value creation in an LBO is not necessarily aimed at creating growth, but rather 
at maximizing the cash flows of the acquired company (Reiten and Sundstrøm, 2001). 
LBOs involve considerable effort by the GPs that goes beyond the completion of the 
acquisition. Once the acquisition is completed, the company must be operated 
optimally to maximize the cash flows of the company's debt and equity.  
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The following figure illustrates the general capital structure of an LBO.  
*
Figure 1: Diagram showing the basic structure of a generic LBO transaction 
(Wikipedia, 2015) 
 
The capital structure of an LBO usually consists of four types of capital; bank loans, 
which typically accounts for 50 %, high-yield debt, often at 10 %, mezzanine debt at 
about 10 %, and PE, which serve as the remaining 30 % (Blaydon and Wainwright, 
2006). Bank debt involves a revolving credit facility that can be paid back and drawn 
down as desired by the company, in addition to several tranches that differs in 
seniority, maturity and cost. High yield debt is used to compensate for debt levels that 
banks are not willing to provide. This debt has a subordinate position to bank debt, 
and thus a higher interest rate. Mezzanine debt has an even lower position than high 
yield debt, and is therefore provided by lenders who require an even higher interest 
rate and warrants as compensation. In the case of a bankruptcy, the different debt 
holders have priority over equity holders in receiving the proceeds from any sale of 
company assets. Therefore, PE is perceived to be the more risky form of capital 
(Blaydon and Wainwright, 2006).  
 
The Federal Reserve has issued guidance persuading market participants to avoid debt 
levels of higher than six times company EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization) in LBOs. Still, according to S&P Capital IQ LCD, 40 
% of all U.S. LBO deals display leverage above this ratio (Tan, 2014). A concern 
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regarding this high use of leverage is if the acquired company runs into trouble and 
paying off debt becomes difficult. The debt-investors will then suffer. Companies 
with higher debt ratios are considered more likely to run into financial difficulties.  
 
2.2.2 Venture Capital 
Venture capital is investments in companies at an early stage or companies seeking to 
expand (Argentum Glossary, 2015). Entrepreneurs often lack the financial means to 
fund their projects themselves, and are therefore looking for alternative sources of 
financing. These types of companies are often developing new technologies, new 
market-concepts and further developing existing products into new fields and areas of 
usage (Kintel and Knutsen, 2014). It is common to classify venture capital in two 
categories: sector and stage. The three most important sectors according to Fraser-
Sampson (2011) is IT, Telecom and Life Science, while stages can be separated into 
seed, early, mid and late stages. 
 
The seed stage is the earliest stage in which the company has yet to earn its first 
stream of revenue. Worth mentioning though, is that some investors tend to interpret 
the first venture capital financing round as a seed stage even though the portfolio 
company might have been around for a while, already earning revenues. The early 
stages will naturally be the stages following the seed stages, but where the company 
still is small and/or young. At the early stages, technological and market competence 
is of high importance as the GP seeks to help the portfolio company develop. In the 
mid- and late stages, financial competence is of high importance as the company at 
that stage is more mature with a developed product and market. At this point, the 
company might have turned profitable and is therefore seeking financing for further 
expansion. (Fraser-Sampson, 2011) 
 
In terms of amount invested, the seed stage only accounts for a small percentage of 
total VC. Seed investments are defined as small capital amounts invested in 
contractors to examine if an idea or a product qualifies for further investment. In 
2014, only 1.5% of the total VC amount invested in the U.S. was invested in seed 
capital, while the remaining 32.7%, 40.9% and 24.9% were invested in the three 
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succeeding stages (PWC MoneyTree Report, 2015). Note, however, that PWC in their 
report refers to the stages as seed, early, expansion and later stages.  
 
!
Figure 2: Diagram showing the basic structure of a generic Venture Capital Fund. 
(Wikipedia, 2015) 
 
2.2.3 Development Capital and Growth Capital 
Development Capital (DC) and Growth Capital (GC) are similar in several ways 
according to Fraser-Sampson (2011). In terms of size, the two categories are small 
compared to, for example, BO, but measured in number of deals they are quite 
significant. Furthermore, in DC and GC the investors usually take minority stakes in 
the companies. A third similarity is that neither makes use of acquisition debt, as 
opposed to BO. 
 
Investors in DC target companies at a late phase in their lifecycle, either at mature or 
declining stages, seeking to improve their earnings. These types of firms often need 
capital for growth or development, in which case DC provides capital in exchange for 
a stake in the company or the transaction might be treated as a convertible bond. A 
convertible bond is a bond that can be converted into a prearranged amount of 
company shares at certain times of the bond's life. This type of transaction can be 
regarded a “money-in” transaction as the capital of the company increases. A so 
called money-out transaction occurs if some of the company's existing owners wish to 
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pull out or in the case of consolidation of shares, in which case the DC fund might 
buy the existing shares. 
 
In GC the investors target companies at an earlier stage than DC. The fund acquires 
companies in growth and if not already profitable, than at least with good prospects. 
This is why, according to Demaria (2010), GC can be considered one of the least 
risky investments within the universe of PE. It follows that, for the same reason, the 
potential reward is lower as the company already is valued quite high. Where the 
focus of DC is to improve the bottom line, the main focus for GC is to improve the 
top line (Fraser-Sampson, 2011). Increasing sales is considered crucial to keep up 
with the growing market. 
 
2.2.4 Real Estate 
Real estate PE is an asset class, which contains investments in real estate property. 
The capital of all LPs committing funds is pooled together, and the GPs select what 
types of real estate that will be included in the fund's portfolio. GPs will typically 
construct their investment portfolios to obtain diversification, i.e. the use of a mixed 
variety of investments to achieve higher return and lower risk. According to Cyril 
(2010), there are several reasons why large buyout operators diversify into real estate. 
One rationale is that the skills needed for real estate investment and large buyout 
investment are basically the same. The GPs have gathered this competence through 
experience and started to offer it in other parts of the market as well. Another reason 
is the extensive evolvement seen in GPs. PE funds have grown to conform legal 
capabilities, a secretary general to coordinate the multiple funds and manage the GP 
structures, and investor relation capabilities.  
 
Broadly speaking, there are three types of investment strategies involved in PE real 
estate: core, value-add and opportunistic funds. The core strategy entails investing in 
stable, fully leased, multi-tenant property in big metropolitan areas. This investment is 
unleveraged, and has a steady and predictable cash flow, which makes it low in risk, 
but also low in potential return. Value added investments involve acquiring property, 
improving it or its management, and then selling it when the value has increased due 
to the changes made. Both the risk and return profiles of this investment type is 
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medium to high. Opportunistic funds invest in property that require a high degree of 
enhancement. This is typically real estate under development and raw land. This type 
of investment displays a high risk and high return profile (Tradespoke, 2015). 
 
2.2.5 Infrastructure 
This asset class includes PE funds that invest in infrastructure assets. Infrastructure 
assets can be defined as the physical structures and networks that provide 
fundamental services to the public and community (Macquarie, 2009). Infrastructure 
is typically divided into two broad categories: economic and social infrastructure. The 
economic sector includes transport, utilities, communication and renewable energy. 
Social infrastructure consists of schools, hospitals and defense buildings, prisons and 
stadiums (OECD, 2014). This suggests that there are a number of different investment 
vehicles available to private investors of infrastructure. Both debt and equity vehicles 
are used in this category. As a result of the many investment vehicles available, not all 
investments within this asset class display the same risk and return characteristics. 
The elected investment will therefore depend on the nature of the asset and overall 
asset allocation of the investor's portfolio.  
 
The different forms of infrastructure investment have different risk, return and time 
horizon profiles. We will now give a brief description of the most common forms of 
infrastructure investments. Direct investments into infrastructure assets such as toll 
roads typically require the longest time horizon, given the long lives of such assets. 
These investments often require large capital outlays and cannot easily be sold due to 
the physical nature of the assets. Direct investments may also expose the investor to 
great political and regulatory risk. An investor can additionally invest indirectly in 
infrastructure by acquiring listed securities of companies that operate in infrastructure 
sectors. This can eliminate the large capital outlay requirement, make it easier for the 
investor to diversify, reduce exposure to liquidity risk and shorten the time horizon. 
Unlisted infrastructure funds enable smaller investors to participate through relatively 
smaller capital requirements and provides diversified exposure (Bitsch et al., 2015). 
PE infrastructure falls within the last category.   
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2.2.6 Fund of Funds 
As the name suggests, a fund of funds does not invest directly in companies, but holds 
a portfolio of several private equity funds. Therefore, rather than investing in one 
specific fund, an investor might invest in a so-called fund of funds. This might be an 
attractive opportunity for an investor seeking the potential returns in the PE market, 
but lacking necessary knowledge and/or resources for investing in specific PE-funds 
or for investors seeking larger diversification (Kocis et al., 2010). The diversification 
however, might differ between funds of funds, as some will target a wide spread of 
different PE funds across the globe, while others might specialize in more specific 
types such as U.S. venture funds etc. (Fraser-Sampson, 2011). A fund targeting 
mainly new funds can be called a Primary (or Primaries) fund of funds, whereas a 
Secondary fund of funds will generally invest in existing funds (Argentum Glossary, 
2015). Where a typical PE fund holds about 20 direct investments, a fund of funds has 
a portfolio of about 20 funds, spreading the investor's risk over as much as 400 direct 
investments (Weidig, Kemmerer and Born, 2005). Even though the focus lies on 
investing in funds, funds of funds might in some cases also invest in companies 
(Kocis et al., 2010).  
 
Funds of funds are not included in the potential zombie fund category. This is due to 
the nature of these funds, which does not meet the criteria for our chosen zombie fund 
definition. Only direct PE funds types can be classified as zombie funds. This will be 
discussed in more detail later in this thesis. 
 
2.2.7 Mezzanine 
Mezzanine is another type of PE investment. More specifically, it is the use of 
mezzanine debt to finance buyout transactions. A mezzanine investor lends capital in 
a buyout transaction, but has, through a warrant, the right to convert all or part of it 
into shares in the acquired company. According to Silbernagel and Vaitkunas (2003), 
mezzanine is a collective term for loan instruments with return and risk profiles that 
lie between senior debt and private equity. “Junk bonds” may also be included in this 
term. Mezzanine debt is usually unsecured, or has security rights that rank below that 
of senior debt. This makes the lender able to charge a higher interest rate as 
compensation for additional liquidation risk (Fraser-Sampson, 2011).  
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Mezzanine can generate several benefits for both the borrower and the investor. The 
use of mezzanine financing can provide benefits to the company as a source of capital 
when bank debt is unavailable or unsuitable. In addition, mezzanine debt is more 
flexible than bank debt. Mezzanine can be a cheaper source of capital, and it is proven 
to increase return on equity. Furthermore, it will reduce the equity requirement for the 
investor, and its interest is generally tax-deductible. It also enables a higher number of 
or larger transactions (Mezzmanagement, 2015).   
 
2.3 Zombie Funds 
Zombie funds are funds that meet the following criteria: 
1. Closed-end with-profits funds that are close to or beyond their pre-agreed 
lifespan 
2. Funds with managers that have not successfully raised follow-on capital and 
have no clear plans of liquidation 
 
The fund's duration and the GP's ability to raise a follow-on fund are two crucial 
aspects of the zombie fund interpretation (Pedersen and Sand, 2014). Zombie funds 
are funds close to or beyond their pre-agreed lifespan with managers who have not 
successfully raised follow-on capital. The potential harm of zombie funds is of 
growing concern to investors and has received a lot of attention in the PE industry 
lately.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, zombie funds are funds with vintage years from 2003 to 
2008, managed by GPs that have not successfully raised a follow-on fund since 2008. 
These funds are retained beyond or approaching the end of their planned lifetime and 
the industry average of ten years. This walk towards a far extended lifespan leads 
such funds to slowly becoming the “living dead” - hence the name zombie funds. 
These are near-dead funds that tie up the investor's money while continuing to charge 
fees even though hopes of profiting from the remaining assets have faded. The GPs sit 
on the fund assets past the expected holding period, with no plans of liquidation or of 
raising an additional fund. 
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Succeeding the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, increased political and economic 
uncertainty, greater sovereign risks, and less available bank financing caused a fall in 
the overall performance of the PE industry. This is demonstrated by a reduction in 
median internal rate of return (IRR) for global buyout funds from 19,5 % to 10,5 % 
(Migliorini, 2014). This poorer performance decreased many LPs willingness to 
allocate capital to this market. PE fundraising suffered as a result of the recession, 
both in terms of the amount of capital raised and the number of GPs able to raise 
funds. From 2008 to 2009 the amount raised by PE funds fell from $688 bn to $319 
bn, while the number of GPs raising funds declined from 1 146 to 751. Consequently, 
many GPs had to delay their plans of raising follow-on funds and cut down 
fundraising targets. Current figures show that PE fundraising has not yet reached the 
record high levels of the PE golden age experienced in the years leading up to the 
crisis (Migliorini, 2014).  
 
!
Figure 3: Total amount raised by general partners over the period 2003-2013 
(Migliorini, 2014) 
 
As a result of the difficulties following the financial crisis the number of zombie 
funds rose dramatically. These funds exhibit significant remaining unrealized values 
(Preqin, 2014). Preqin (2014) defines zombie funds as seven to twelve year old active 
funds, managed by GPs that have failed to raise capital within the past seven years. 
Our definition conforms to the one applied by Preqin.  
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Preqin (2013b) reported the identification of approximately 1 200 zombie funds in 
2013, and that as much as $116 bn of PE assets might be trapped in such funds. Using 
their updated database (2015), we identify 1 274 zombie funds, which indicates that 
the problem is not going away. Furthermore, Preqin's findings suggest that the median 
distributions to paid-in capital are much lower for zombie funds than for their peers.   
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3. Agency Theory and Asymmetric Information 
Agency theory highlights possible incentive and monitoring problems between a 
principal and an agent. A principal-agent relationship occurs when one party is 
dependent upon the actions of another party. The principal is the party that delegates 
property rights, while the agent is the delegated party (Duffner, 2003). In a financial 
environment, the principal is typically the investor while the investee acts as the 
agent. The agent (company management) is closer to the company's operation and 
therefore better informed than the principal. Problems can arise if agents behave 
opportunistically, i.e. exploits this superior information to maximize their own utility, 
often at the expense of the principal. The focus of agency theory is the search for 
relationship designs that align the interests of the two parties (Duffner, 2003).  
 
Previous papers by Duffner (2003) and Mehta (2004) suggest that agency problems 
can be broadly divided into three large categories, namely adverse selection, holdup 
and moral hazard. Adverse selection is typically associated with asymmetric 
information and concerns information bias on the investment date. This problem can 
occur in markets where one party cannot discriminate between good and bad quality 
of the other party or investment opportunities. The agent will have an information 
advantage. The principal will face difficulties in choosing the good investment 
opportunities over the bad ones, and risks being forced out of the market due to this 
uncertainty (Brickley et al., 2008). Holdup describes situations in which the agent 
systematically uses gaps in incomplete contracts to his own advantage. After 
investments have been made and sunk costs incurred by the principal, the agent 
reveals his hidden intention, forcing the principal to renegotiate the terms of the 
contract. In such cases, the agent will have the upper hand in the negotiations 
(Duffner, 2003). Moral hazard concerns information bias after the investment is made 
(Fossen et al., 1999). Moral hazard occurs when the agent either uses information not 
observable by the principal or performs actions not observable by the principal to 
promote self-interests at the expense of the principal's utility. The main issue lies in 
the contractility of actions of the agent. The investor can typically only observe the 
company's final output or success, and not the actions taken by the company. It is 
therefore difficult to distinguish the results from chance or bad behavior (Duffner, 
2003).     
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Theory suggests the following solutions and mitigations to agency problems: aligning 
interests, monitoring, bonding, vertical integration, signaling, information disclosure 
and creating a dynamic relationship (Duffner, 2003).  
• Aligning interests of the principal and agent address the problems of adverse 
selection, holdup and moral hazard. This refers to different measures that can 
be applied to assimilate the agent's personal utility maximization and the 
principal's interest. Examples of measures used are sanctions, convertible debt 
and collateral. 
• Monitoring is a measure aimed at solving moral hazard and holdup problems. 
Monitoring means that the actions expected from the agent is put down in a 
contract, and that the principal later can control for compliance. Sanctions are 
very important in this context.  
• Bonding also targets moral hazard and holdup problems. Bonding entails the 
agent to prove, at his own cost, that his behavior is in compliance with the 
interests of the principal. Bonding can be achieved through voluntary 
reporting to the investor and third party auditing.  
• Vertical integration is a technique used against holdup that tries to integrate 
the invested company into a hierarchical structure with authority. 
• Signaling is a measure against adverse selection, and involves obtaining 
credible information regarding the investment quality, risk and expected return 
for the investor. This information would otherwise be very costly for the 
investor to retrieve.  
• Information disclosure concerns the adverse selection problem, where the 
market participants try to make themselves more transparent before a contract 
is entered into. Measures to aid information disclosure involve screening, third 
party auditing and information exchanges.  
• Creating a dynamic relationship focuses on solving problems of adverse 
selection, holdup and moral hazard. This process aims at creating a 
relationship between the participants over time that will benefit both sides of 
the repeated transactions. 
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In addition to the solutions listed above, we wish to highlight reputation as an 
important mechanism in agency relationships. Having a good reputation is crucial in 
any voluntary market and provides incentives for the agent to align his actions with 
those in the best interest of the principal.   
 
3.1 Agency theory in Private Equity 
PE firms act as a financial intermediary in the market. On the one hand there are 
investors seeking return on their money, and on the other there are portfolio 
companies seeking capital and competence. As an intermediary, the PE firm will both 
hold the role as an agent, in the relationship with the investors, and as a principal, in 
the relationship with the portfolio companies. We can therefore separate the agency 
problem in two main categories, the relationship PE fund - Portfolio Company, and 
Investor – PE fund.  
 
In the relationship between the PE firm and the portfolio company, the PE fund will 
have certain expectations of the portfolio company management, thus taking on the 
role as the principal. The portfolio company, as the party seeking capital, will have an 
information advantage. To solve this issue, the PE firm will thoroughly analyze 
potential investments using due diligence and valuation upfront (Duffner, 2003). The 
moral hazard aspect of the PE fund - portfolio company relationship is not critical due 
to the GPs active participation in company operations and the resulting monitoring 
ability.  
 
Adverse selection may occur in the relationship between the GPs and the LPs, as the 
LPs do not have complete information regarding the GPs talent or investment skills. 
Mehta (2014) list two main solutions to this problem. Profit sharing is an opportunity 
for GP to signal their skills and talents. A confident GP will more often accept a more 
uncertain and performance based compensation scheme than will a less confident GP. 
In essence, a compensation scheme that relies more on performance (carried interest) 
than fixed fees (management fees) may signal a high quality investment-team. This 
way the LPs may seek the seemingly better GPs by considering how the 
compensation is designed. Covenants may be included in the limited partnership both 
for reducing adverse selection and moral hazard, and are explained below.  
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As investors during the fund's lifetime learn more about the GPs' investment skills 
and abilities to produce high returns, their willingness to invest in the same PE firm in 
the future is affected. In the case of a GP that has performed poorly, and therefore 
might have difficulties raising another fund, the GP might be incentivized to charge 
high fees and postpone the liquidation of the fund at the expense of the LP, as in the 
case of a zombie fund. This might be seen as a hold-up problem in PE (Phalippou, 
2010). 
 
Moral hazard is also an important aspect in private equity relations where the LPs 
cannot perfectly monitor the GP's effort. Again, both profit sharing and covenants are 
listed as the two most important ways to reduce the moral hazard problem. With a 
performance-based compensation, such as carried interest, the agent (GP) is 
incentivized to exert high effort. When GPs are able to produce high returns by 
quality investments and work, they will increase their wages as they receive an agreed 
upon part of the fund's return. Covenants will also effectively reduce moral hazard, as 
they directly restrict the GP's behavior after the point where the LPs have committed 
capital. Gompers and Lerner (1996) divide these types of covenants into three primary 
categories; covenants related to the overall management of the fund, the activities of 
the GP, and the permissible types of investments. Those related to overall 
management work to restrict the structure of the funds. Usage of debt might, for 
example, be extensive if the GP want to increase risk, considering his own position as 
a sort of option (high upside, but limited downside). The GP might also wish to 
influence the performance of other funds through co-investments or boosting the 
performance of underperforming firms by increasing funding. The second main group 
of covenants relates to the GP's behavior, both associated with its relationship with 
portfolio companies and the fund itself, and outside the fund. As an example, risk-
averse GPs might want to sell their partnership interest, reducing the risk related to 
performance, an action not in the LPs best interest. Outside the fund, GPs might take 
on other roles, for example in the boards of other firms. If the amount of time spent on 
such activities becomes too high, it might reduce the GPs focus on the fund and thus 
its performance. The third group is as implied, types of investments the GP is allowed 
or encouraged to do. This might be related to sectors, markets, firm-sizes etc. 
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However, it should be noted that including such covenants significantly increases the 
need for monitoring, and might be difficult to enforce. (Gompers and Lerner, 1996) 
 
In some cases, large LPs may be given the opportunity to sit on advisory boards. 
Participating in these boards may enhance their ability for monitoring decision-
making and exert an advisory role, for example related to hiring and dismissing GPs. 
(Mehta, 2004)   
 
The PE incentive structure (GPs sources of revenue) can create conflicts of interest 
between GPs and LPs. After the global financial crisis and the fall in the performance 
of the PE industry, the number of GPs able to raise a follow-on fund decreased. 
Migliorini (2014) concluded, based on interviews with LPs, that LPs loss of faith in 
the GP, underperformance, significant changes in the investment team and unclear 
succession plans are the most prevalent reasons why GPs fail to raise subsequent 
funds. Once any of these factors are present, the chances of successfully raising a 
follow-on fund are small. The PE fund will then be on its way to becoming a zombie 
fund, and several potential conflicts of interests can arise between LPs and GPs.  
 
In the case of a fund whose GPs are confident of raising a successive fund, the 
revenue structure will align the interests of the LPs and GPs. The need to show strong 
early realizations and robust IRRs to ensure the raising of a follow-on fund will 
induce PE firms to exit in a timely manner. Thus the importance of a dynamic 
relationship and reputational effects becomes apparent. The promise of raising a new 
fund will increases chances of earning future regular income (through management 
fees) with carried interest opportunities from prior funds giving an opportunity for 
performance driven revenue.   
 
Conflicts of interest can arise when the fund suffers from poor performance so the 
hurdle rate is out of reach and carried interest revenues are off the table, and when the 
fund is unable to raise follow-on capital. If carried interest from the existing funds is 
unlikely and no management fees from new funds are in sight, the GPs must rely on 
current management fees as the main source of income. In effect, there are no 
incentives for the PE fund to exit investments in a proper time fashion as this would 
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reduce their fee-based income and possibly result in internal restructuring (Migliorini, 
2014). The GPs will then keep the fund artificially alive, as this is their most lucrative 
option. Management fees can still be charged and some GPs even charge their own 
“consulting fee” as to collect as much money from the fund as possible (Pedersen and 
Sand, 2014).  
 
Furthermore, zombie funds can hurt the quality of the GP team and investments, thus 
negatively affecting the return to LPs (Migliorini, 2014). As soon as investment 
professionals become aware of the dark future awaiting the GP, the investment team 
can quickly evaporate. There may be personal reputational effects of participating in 
running a zombie fund, which might influence one's entire career. The best typically 
leave first, thus reducing the quality of the team. Moreover, the management of the 
portfolio company may lose confidence in the GP. As a result of these adverse events, 
several scenarios can arise that will hurt the LP's return: 
• The commitment and attention to the portfolio company may decrease 
• Higher management fees paid to GPs by LPs 
• Capital distributions to LPs may be delayed, which reduce the time value of 
the investment 
• Delayed exit may cause lower exit values as forced or semi-forced exits 
contain lower bids 
 
3.1.1 LP Solutions 
As indicated by Migliorini's (2004) findings, it is crucial for investors to address the 
problems of zombie funds to safeguard returns. Both short term and long term actions 
can help solve these potential problems. The short-term actions propose solutions for 
investors currently invested in zombie funds, while the long-term actions serve as 
guidelines for avoiding investment in potential zombie funds.  
 
There are four short-term responses for investors currently invested in zombie funds: 
restructuring the terms of the fund, selling a majority of the portfolio to a secondary 
investor, sale of the GP and removal of the GP (Migliorini, 2014).  
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Figure 4: Short term actions for LPs to address zombie funds (Migliorini, 2014) 
 
Restructuring the fund terms concerns alteration of given terms of the limited 
partnership agreement to further align GP and LP interests. Frequently used measures 
are reduction of carried interest, management fee review, fund extensions and team 
restructuring. These techniques will align the interests of the GP with those of the 
LPs, while simultaneously benefit the LPs as the cost of reviewing the terms often is 
lower than potential losses resulting from uncommitted GPs. Nevertheless, Migliorini 
(2014) finds that LPs are typically reluctant to agree to alteration of fund terms as 
they feel that this would reward perceived adversarial behavior.  
 
The second cited option for an investor involves the sale of a majority of the fund's 
LP interests to an independent buyer. The secondary buyer becomes the main, if not 
the sole, LP in the fund. This technique is commonly used when one or more of the 
following scenarios are present: 
• LPs disagree on what to do with the fund's GP 
• Most LPs want or need liquidity 
• The GP has the credibility to keep managing the fund, as could be the case 
when GP mistakes are amplified by external factors 
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Sale of the GP involves LPs to actively encourage the GP to merge with another 
established GP in hope of improving the quality of the investment team. This may 
also increase the chances of successfully raising a follow-on fund.  
 
Removal of the GP by the fund's LPs is the most extreme measure LPs can undertake. 
The limited partnership agreement commonly includes a no-fault removal clause that 
permits LPs to terminate GP management of the fund at any time, subject to the 
payment of a predetermined fine. Migliorini (2004) suggests that this option is rarely, 
if ever, used. The rationale supporting this finding is that removal of the GP can be 
more risky and expensive than maintaining the current position. If the removal right is 
exercised, LPs will have to pay the penalty in addition to hiring a new GP, unless they 
sell their share of the fund in the secondary market. The risk is based on the fact that 
this new GP will know less about the portfolio than the previous GP.    
 
The long term solutions available to LPs builds on strengthening the screening 
process of potential investment funds as to avoid allocating capital to weak GPs, in 
effect, reducing the chances of having zombie funds in one's portfolio. The investor 
can review the fund structure/ limited partnership agreement for new commitments, 
strengthen monitoring to detect weak GPs early and commit capital to GPs managing 
multiple funds (Migliorini, 2014).  
 
Review of the fund structure can help mitigate the strongest conflict of interest after 
the expiration of the investment period, namely the link between committed capital 
and management fees. One technique to achieve this goal is to review the fund 
structure up front. It may, for instance, be an option to include a provision stating that 
management fees will be reduced after the expiration of the fund, effectively reducing 
GPs incentive to postpone the sale of existing assets. Another technique is to reduce 
the threshold and penalty for GP removal. If lowered, these terms will provide LPs 
with greater bargaining power and increase GP incentive for proper exit. An 
additional measure LPs can take on is to reduce the right to automatic extension. 
Currently, GPs can ask for an automatic one-year fund extension. LPs could, for 
instance, push for board approval for determining this matter. Finally, LPs can review 
the Key Man Clause. This clause allows GPs to replace other key GPs subject to 
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certain conditions. By removing or altering this clause, the LPs can enhance the 
possibility of keeping the investment team close to the original one. 
 
LPs can detect risky and weak investments early by strengthening their monitoring 
skills. The intention is to be able to sell the stakes of risky investments early on at a 
higher price and avoid handling possible complex situations for those investments at a 
risk of becoming zombie funds.     
 
The issues of zombie funds typically emerge in standalone funds (Migliorini, 2004). 
LPs can therefore benefit from investing in GPs that manage multiple funds across 
investment strategies and geographies, compared to GPs operating a single fund. The 
risk and potential losses from an underperforming fund is reduced when there are 
several streams of revenue. Furthermore, GPs managing more than one fund will have 
a broader reputation to uphold in the LP community which gives incentives for 
compliance with what is expected by LPs.  
 
3.1.2 GP Solutions 
Migliorini (2014) suggests three critical areas on which GPs of zombie funds should 
focus in order to be in a better position with respect to future fund-raising. The most 
obvious aspect is deliverance of positive performance on the existing portfolio. 
Continuous improvement of the portfolio companies is important if they are to seek 
future funding. After all, investors in the fund are expecting good returns even though 
the funds' lifetime is exceeding the market standards, and GPs with better performing 
funds are generally more likely to raise follow-on funds and larger funds (Kaplan and 
Schoar, 2005).  
 
More crucial however, is the GPs ability to maintain investors' trust, i.e. to preserve a 
good reputation among investors. The LPs might accept relatively poor performance 
if they have trust in how the GPs are managing the fund. Disclosing useful 
information may help both current investors, but also potential external investors, in 
evaluating how the GP is in fact creating value in the portfolio. As the GP itself is the 
main source of information for the LPs, transparency is crucial for maintaining trust 
(Ghani, 2011). As in the entire finance industry and most businesses, professional 
* 35*
conduct is of high importance and essential in order to uphold trust from investors and 
other stakeholders. The EVCA Handbook (2014) lists six codes of conduct, all 
mandatory for EVCA members:  
1. Act with integrity 
2. Keep your promises 
3. Disclose conflicts of interests 
4. Act in fairness 
5. Maintain confidentiality 
6. Do no harm to the industry 
 
Acting with professional conduct and transparency, as well as managing the fund with 
the LPs best interests in mind, is expected.  
 
A third element is the reframing of the GP's equity story. Essentially, this means 
staying consistent with respect to investment strategy and maintaining a relevant and 
skilled team in order to signal what the investors can expect from a potential follow-
on fund. In the end, the exits of the portfolio companies need to be successful, 
particularly on the deals most related to future follow-on funds. (Migliorini, 2014) 
 
3.2 Zombie Funds and the Secondary Market 
In 2013, Preqin identified 1 732 portfolio companies held by zombie funds and 
correspondingly $ 116 bn worth of assets trapped under their management (Preqin, 
2013b). However destructive for the current investor, such portfolio companies may 
provide investment opportunities for fund managers and other potential acquirers on 
the search for assets at discounted prices. The secondary market can as such serve as 
an interesting investment for potential investors, while offer some solution to GPs 
with zombie funds and LPs invested in them. A fund manager can, for instance, take 
over the assets of a zombie fund through a secondary buyout, thereby generating an 
exit and liquidity for the primary investor (Preqin, 2013b).  
 
A large part of the PE secondary market is the involvement of secondary buyers in 
GP-led transactions and fund restructurings. Zombie funds are typically funds close to 
or past their pre-agreed lifespan with significant unrealized values. Furthermore, it is 
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uncertainty related to what part of this remaining value that can be realized. Investors 
in these funds are often unwilling to back new funds by the same managers, and the 
investments in existing funds may be deprived of the capital required for value 
creation. According to Preqin (2014), LPs are increasingly considering investment 
opportunities in the secondary market. This serves, to some degree, as a solution as 
willing sellers are bought out while GPs get a new injection of capital to the fund.  
 
As a consequence of the uncertainty relating to the realization of remaining assets, 
zombie funds are hard to price in a secondary market. The problem is the clear 
incentive for the GPs to hold on to investments to collect management fees, which 
may give the incentive to overstate the value of their assets. It has been argued that 
zombie fund managers state unrealistic high values on their remaining assets (Pulliam 
and Eaglesham, 2012). This can make it hard for an LP invested in a zombie fund to 
trade his stakes. Furthermore, secondary trades of stakes in zombie funds tend to sell 
for 30 - 40 % less than what the GP team valued the assets at (Pulliam and 
Eaglesham, 2012).   
 
The secondary PE market still has some limitations that may contribute to the 
challenges of secondary zombie trades. However, 15 % of LPs interviewed by Preqin 
(2014) considered this secondary market to be of core importance in their PE 
portfolios. 33 % of these respondents also stated that investments in the PE secondary 
market are of increasing importance in their portfolios. This may be an indication that 
more and more LPs view secondary PE transactions as part of their investment 
strategy.  
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4. Theory on Diversification and Performance in Private Equity  
In this section we will look at theory behind diversification and return in PE.  
 
4.1 Diversification 
A portfolio is a grouping of investment vehicles owned and controlled by an investor 
or organization. Diversification is a risk management technique that involves infusing 
a variety of different investment classes within a portfolio. Different asset classes 
have different risk and return profiles, and thus perform differently under various 
economic circumstances. The rationale behind diversification is to adapt and optimize 
the relationship between risk and return, thus improving investment results. A 
portfolio of different kinds of investments will, on average, yield a higher return and 
expose the investor to less risk than any of the individual investments held in a 
portfolio. There are several factors to consider when trying to achieve the desired 
effect of diversification within PE. Two of the most crucial factors are GPs ability to 
select the appropriate portfolio companies and investors accessibility to the best 
funds. Previous research suggests that successful manager selection is the strongest 
contributing factor to above-industry returns (Nygård and Normann, 2008).  
 
4.1.1 Diversification and Private Equity 
One should differentiate diversification with PE as part of a broad portfolio of many 
asset classes from diversification within PE funds. Both of these techniques are 
discussed below. 
 
An investor who includes a portion of PE in an otherwise well-diversified portfolio 
does so to move closer to the efficient frontier of risky assets, i.e. the graphical 
representation of the risk-return tradeoffs for different portfolio compositions. PE 
seems to display a modest correlation to public equities, which would imply a 
diversification benefit by allocating a portion of one's portfolio to PE (Fort 
Washington, 2006). Meyer and Mathonet (2011), on the other hand, argue that this is 
not necessarily the case as data for PE investments is relatively deficient because of 
their private nature. They suggest that conservative valuations, the scarcity of 
available data (due to the lack of transparency) and a rather inefficient secondary 
market make such correlation calculations imprecise. Investments in portfolio 
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companies will in principle depend on general market conditions such as economic 
cycles, regulations, trading regimes, whether the timing is good for IPOs etc. These 
conditions point to at least some degree of correlation between PE and public equities 
(Nygård and Normann, 2008).  
 
Gompers and Lerner (2001) find that adding PE to a portfolio shifts the efficient 
frontier towards higher return accompanied by lower risk. Fort Washington (2006) 
further demonstrates that adding 5% to 10% PE exposure to a portfolio will increase 
expected return while reducing the risk exposure. There are, however, several factors 
to consider in this diversification decision. The part of a total portfolio allocated to PE 
should not be too big as one risks becoming under-diversified and exposing oneself to 
great liquidity risk. The absolute size of the PE part of the portfolio must also be taken 
into account as too large or too small amounts may have advantages and 
disadvantages. Furthermore, it is crucial to consider what a PE investment will 
contribute to a current portfolio. If, for instance, the investor does not have enough 
capital to invest in PE without it affecting the rest of the portfolio, adding a portion of 
PE may not lead to the desired effects. PE investments require large capital outlays, a 
relatively long time horizon and access to the top quartile funds and GPs. Investments 
in PE may thus be demanding for a private investor. A solution for private investors is 
to invest in funds of funds (Fort Washington, 2006).    
 
One way a PE fund can diversify its portfolio is by including several portfolio 
companies. Merely adding companies to the portfolio, not necessarily from different 
industries, can be considered the most primitive way of diversifying. This is called 
“naive diversification” (Lossen, 2006). The fund can increase its diversification 
further by spreading the investments over a time dimension, called dynamic 
diversification. Moreover, Lossen (2006) mentions three ways the PE fund can reduce 
risk while taking company characteristics into consideration (systematic 
diversification): by diversifying across financing stages, industries and/or countries. 
 
According to Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) PE funds only diversify to a limited 
extent with respect to the number of portfolio companies held in their portfolios. The 
average number of portfolio companies is found to be 16.1 for BO and 37.3 for VC. 
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This is a seemingly large difference, but could be explained by the considerably 
higher risk of investing in VC compared to BO and the fact that a BO investment 
usually consists of a substantially larger capital amount than VC. Furthermore, 
diversification with respect to different industries is found to be low compared to 
public equity funds. PE funds have, to a great extent, a tendency to give more weight 
to one dominant industry in their portfolio. Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) find 
that the average PE fund invest close to 40% in one specific industry.  
 
Considering the fact that PE funds are acting as active owners in their investments, 
high expertise and competence is required within the markets and businesses in which 
the portfolio companies operate. Seeking to add as much value to their portfolio 
companies as possible, and in this way providing high returns to the investors, PE 
funds often specialize with respect to certain financing stages, industries and 
geographic areas. Therefore, achieving a high degree of diversification is problematic 
for these types of funds (Lossen, 2006).  
 
4.2 Performance in Private Equity 
Financial assets are typically divided in two groups; listed securities and unlisted 
securities. Listed securities, such as stocks and bonds, are instruments listed on a 
public exchange. As listed securities are constantly traded in the market, measuring 
performance is a relatively simple matter. Assuming efficient markets, observed 
market prices represent the market's perceived underlying value of the given asset. 
Therefore, the historical return of listed securities can be measured based on observed 
market prices over a certain time period. The risk of the same instruments can be 
measured as the standard deviation of such a series of observations based on the same 
time period. In short, returns are calculated as the ratio between the price at the 
beginning of the investment period and the price at the end of the investment period. 
It is also possible for investors still holding securities to calculate unrealized returns 
using the same method. Investors may also view the returns as average periodical 
returns, e.g. yearly returns. These averages can be calculated both as an arithmetic 
average and as a geometric average, the latter usually being preferred as it takes into 
account the compounded interest effect.  
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Unlisted securities, such as PE and real estate, are instruments not listed on a public 
exchange. Unlike stocks and bonds, PE investments extend over a long time horizon, 
with the typical fund lifetime of ten years and possible extension of two years 
(Phalippou and Gottschalg, 2005). Furthermore, PE investments have low transaction 
volumes due to the lack of a well-established and functioning secondary market. 
Given that PE portfolios are not frequently traded, market prices to appropriately 
calculate periodic returns do not exist (Kothari et al., 2012). It is therefore not 
possible to use the most common methods as described by standard financial theory to 
measure PE risk and return.  We will now describe the most common techniques used 
to measure the performance of PE funds.   
 
4.2.1 Performance Measurement in Private Equity 
There are three common performance measures used in the PE industry: internal rate 
of return (IRR), public market equivalent (PME) and multiple values (Kintel and 
Knudsen, 2014).  
 
4.2.2 Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
IRR is the discount rate that gives a net present value (NPV) of a series of (positive 
and negative) cash flows equal to zero (Ellis et al., 2012). IRR is the most commonly 
used performance measure for PE and is mathematically represented by:   
 !"# = 0 = !!1+ ! ! 
 
Where NPV is net present value, Ci is net cash flow in the period, and r is the 
calculated internal rate of return 
 
The internal rate of return represents the average return on invested capital, given all 
cash inflows and outflows. IRR is normally measured as a net of fees or gross of fees 
rate. Gross IRR is calculated using cash flows between investors and funds before the 
deduction of management fees, carried interest and other fixed costs. For net IRR 
calculations, the same cash flows are used, but management fees, carried interest and 
other fixed costs are subtracted. Net IRR provides a better measure of the investment 
return as it represent the actual cash flows taken place between the fund and the 
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investor. Realized IRR is calculated after the liquidation of the fund and is the most 
credible measure as it is based on historic figures.  
 
According to Clausen (2007) there are four main reasons why IRR is well suited to 
measure performance within PE. First is the lack of an efficient secondary market for 
PE fund units. PE fund investments are less frequently traded in the secondary market 
than listed securities. The lack of continuous transactional market information makes 
periodic returns unavailable as a measure of performance. Second, IRR takes into 
account the cash flow profile of PE. Investors will experience a varied cash outflow as 
the fund draws in capital and a stream of inflowing capital as the fund realizes its 
investments. These cash flows are not known ex ante. Third, IRR accounts for the 
reinvestment effect and the time value of money. In order to provide a sensible picture 
of fund performance one needs a measure that, given all disbursements and receipts, 
calculates reinvested average returns (per period) over the total lifetime. The time 
value of money is included since IRR, by definition, is the discount rate that gives a 
net present value of zero. Last, contributed capital is considered fixed. The GPs will 
have total control over the capital amount injected into portfolio companies at any 
time. Committed capital is thus considered as fixed even though it in practice is paid 
in tranches. It is therefore recommended to use a cash-weighted return as performance 
measure for closed PE funds, a requirement satisfied by IRR (Clausen, 2007).  
 
4.2.3 Interim IRR 
PE funds are usually long-lived and interim IRR is used as a performance measure for 
non-liquidated funds. Interim estimates of return are based on an appraisal of 
expected future cash flows. As such, interim IRR represents an estimate and not 
actual realized return (Ellis and Steer, 2011). To calculate interim IRR, the portfolio's 
net asset value (NAV) must be assessed:  
 
!"# = 0 = !!1+ ! !!!!! + !"#! 
 
Where NPV is net present value, Ci is net cash flow in the period, r is the calculated 
internal rate of return, and NAVI is the estimated net asset value.  
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NAV is based on the expected present discounted sum of future cash flows, and is 
such a subjective value, making interim IRR an uncertain estimate during the first 
years of the fund's life. Once funds are sufficiently mature, usually after four to six 
years, no evidence of systematic over- or under-valuation across a sample of UK 
funds can be found (Ellis and Steer, 2011). Interim IRR typically approaches actual 
IRR at the end of the fund's life because the subjective value of future expected cash 
flows then constitutes a smaller part of the IRR.  
 
!
Figure 5: Typical evolution of realized IRR and interim IRR (Burgel, 2000) 
 
An alternative is to use the price of a recent investment to calculate NAV. This 
method can be used when the investment being valued was itself made recently. The 
cost of the recent investment will usually provide a good estimate for the fair value of 
the investment. Contrary to NAVs calculated using expected future cash flows, the 
validity of this estimate will decrease over time (IPEV, 2009).  
 
4.2.4 The J-curve  
As already suggested, one must distinguish realized IRR and interim IRR. Previous 
research tries to eliminate data from unrealized funds, or at least the data from 
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sufficiently young funds, when analyzing PE historical returns (Clausen, 2007). This 
is particularly important since the majority of fund earnings are realized in the last 
part of the fund's life. The early stages of any investment period will be characterized 
by cash outflows, thus the low interim IRR of young PE funds will unjustly lower the 
average return of the industry. The problem is that the residual value used in the 
interim IRR calculation does not necessarily reflect the actual values in the fund, and 
may give a false expectation of the future.  
 
PE investments show particular cash flow and return attributes known as the J-curve. 
Every stage of a PE investment will have an effect on the fund's cash flow. The 
investment phase is characterized by negative cash flows, but as soon as the fund 
starts to generate earnings and distribute capital to investors, positive cash flows are 
obtained. This pattern is illustrated by J-curve, named after the graphical 
representation of interim IRR from fund inception to termination. An important factor 
to consider is that the curve shows cumulative interim IRR and not interim IRR for 
any specific year.   
 
!
Figure 6: The J-curve effect of PE (Wikipedia, 2015) 
 
The NAV will initially be valued at the cost of the investments made by the fund, 
while advisory fees, start-up and other fixed costs are paid continuously. Additionally, 
loss-bearing investments, especially in the VC area, will be recognized as an 
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impairment loss. The first years of a fund will thus be characterized by negative 
interim IRRs. This negative pattern will be present until the fund starts to realize 
investments and the return increases. According to Burgel (2000), it is only after three 
to five years that interim IRR can provide a reasonable indication for the final IRR. 
After seven to eight years it is unlikely that significant changes in interim IRR will 
materialize. Towards fund termination, the interim IRR has a tendency to converge 
toward the finally realized IRR.  
 
4.2.5 Advantages and Drawbacks of IRR 
The advantage of IRR, and the main reason why it is normally used as a performance 
measure in the PE market today, is that it somewhat solves the issue of the cash flow 
structure in a PE fund. As the GP calls capital when it is needed and ’randomly’ 
distributes it, other performance measurements used in other financial assets, such as 
stocks, become troublesome to apply. 
 
Berk and DeMarzo (2013) list three general pitfalls one should beware of when 
evaluating IRR as a performance measure; delayed investments, multiple IRRs and 
nonexistent IRR. Delayed investments are investments represented by a positive cash 
flow first, followed by negative cash flows. This is not relevant for PE funds as it is 
necessary with a cash outflow in the beginning of the funds lifetime for investing in 
companies. In some cases a project might have more than one IRR, i.e. the project's 
NPV is 0 for more than one discount rate. It is difficult to evaluate performance in 
these cases, especially if the cost of capital lies between the given IRRs. The third 
pitfall is the case of nonexistent IRR. The project might simply not have any discount 
rates for which the NPV is zero, thus NPV will always be either negative or positive. 
 
In addition to these pitfalls, Phalippou (2008) points to four issues with IRR in a PE 
context. First, as timing of the cash flows can significantly influence the IRR, the GP 
can use this to their advantage, for example earlier exits at the expense of total return 
for the investors. Additionally, by pooling funds together the GP is able to ‘hide’ poor 
performing funds (with negative IRR) as the pooled group may present a good IRR 
even though, if separated, only one of them has a positive IRR. A third issue is related 
to the reinvestment assumption. For IRR to be a proper performance measure, the 
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intermediary dividends must be reinvested at the IRR rate. If not, the IRR will 
overstate (if positive) or understate (if negative) the effective return, thus give an 
exaggerated picture of the volatility of performance. Furthermore, using IRR will lead 
to upward-biased average performance measures. Last, GPs, incentivized by ‘kick-
backs’, will be tempted to adjust cash flow amounts.  
 
4.2.6 Modified IRR  
Phalippou (2008) argues that using modified IRR (MIRR) is a better solution than the 
simple IRR. In calculating MIRR the cash flows are broken down to distributions 
(positive cash flows) and contributions (negative cash flows). All the contributions 
are discounted to a single present value with a given discount factor and all cash 
distributions are assumed to grow to a single future value at a given reinvestment rate 
(Kocis et al., 2010). Calculating the MIRR will then be an easy matter using the 
following formula: 
 
!"## = !" !"#$%$&'!!"#ℎ!!"#$%, !"#$%"&'("$'!!"#$−!" !"#$%&'"!!"#ℎ!!"#$%, !"#$#%&!!"#$ − 1!  
 
Where MIRR is modified IRR, i is number of periods, FV is future value, and PV is 
present value. 
 
Assuming a reinvestment rate or looking at how the cash is actually invested by the 
investor will in most cases lead to a more conservative and correct picture of the 
actual return.   
 
An argument against using MIRR is often that knowing which funds are performing 
well, the investors can reinvest the dividends in these funds, in which case the IRR 
will provide a correct image of the return. However, Phalippou (2008) argues that, for 
high performing IRR-funds, picking and reinvesting in equally good funds is simply 
unrealistic. Furthermore, computing MIRR on the investors track record, will take this 
ability into account.  
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Another valid argument against MIRR as a performance measure for PE funds is the 
fact that the reinvestment rate is not within the GPs reach. Therefore one can argue 
that it is not a good measure of the fund's performance, even though it might provide 
a good picture of the investor's return.  Another drawback is that MIRR assumes that 
the cash is invested at the reinvestment rate during the expected lifetime of the fund, 
even after all portfolio investments are liquidated. This can be solved by using 
isolated MIRR (IMIRR), similar to MIRR but calculated only over the funds ‘active’ 
lifetime. (Ellis et al., 2012) 
 
4.2.7 Average IRR, Weighted IRR and Pooled IRR 
Several methods exist for calculating the return of the PE industry as a whole, with 
the average IRR being one. This measure assumes an equal weight of all funds 
regardless of fund size and capital amount, and will therefore not give an accurate 
impression of the overall industry performance. In order to solve this challenge, a 
weighted IRR could be used. Weighted IRR, on the other hand, does not account for 
the different time periods of the money at work. A solution could be the use of an 
overall IRR, called pooled IRR, constructed by collecting monthly cash flows of all 
funds and calculating the IRR based on the industry net cash flow. This method 
entails perceiving each individual fund's cash flows as part of one large entity (Kintel 
and Knudsen, 2014).  
 
4.2.8 Multiples 
The use of multiples is a completely different way of looking at PE returns than the 
IRR. It should be used as a supplement to IRR. This method consists of creating ratios 
between different values and provides insight to a fund's development. Multiples used 
for PE fund returns are Distributed over Paid In (DPI), Paid In to Committed Capital 
(PICC), Residual Value to Paid In (RVPI) and Total Value to Paid In (TVPI) (Fraser-
Sampson, 2011). It is important to note that these multiples are restricted to analyzing 
fund returns and not the returns of individual transactions.  
 
4.2.9 Distributions over Paid In (DPI) 
Distributed over paid in (DPI) is a ratio of cash distributed back to the investor over 
cash paid in from the investor. This is usually a good measure towards the end of the 
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fund's life, as most of the values at this point should be realized (Fraser-Sampson, 
2011). This ratio is also called the realization multiple (Kocis et al, 2010). 
 !"# = !"#"$%&'()!!"#$%"&'$"()#!"#"$%&'()!!"#$!!"!!"#$%"& 
 
4.2.10 Paid In to Committed Capital (PICC) 
PICC is not a measurement of the funds performance but rather a multiple describing 
how much the LP's have paid in, i.e. how much the GP has invested, relative to how 
much is committed. This can be useful in considering whether the fund is having 
trouble putting all committed capital to good use. (Fraser-Sampson, 2011) 
 !"## = !"#"$%&'()!!"#$!!"!!"#$%"&!"##$%%&'!!"#$%"&  
 
4.2.11 Residual Value to Paid In (RVPI) 
RVPI measures the unrealized values in the fund compared to the paid-in capital and 
is therefore often referred to as the unrealized multiple. This provides insight to how 
the fund has created value before liquidating their investments and distributing the 
cash to the investors. (Kocis et. al, 2010, Fraser-Sampson, 2011) 
 !"#$ = !"#$"%&'(!"#"$%&'()!!"#!!!"!!"#$%"& 
 
Where Valuation is the value of the fund's remaining investments.  
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4.2.12 Total Value to Paid In (TVPI) 
By combining DPI and RVPI as described above, we get TVPI. TVPI is a measure 
that considers both the distributions and the residual values in the fund over paid in 
capital by the investor. This multiple is the most common to look at in the PE market 
as it provides the better picture of the funds total performance during its life. (Kocis 
et. al, 2010, Fraser-Sampson, 2011) 
 !"#$ = !"# + !"#$ = !"#"$%&'()!!"#$%"&'$"()# + !"#$"%&'(!"#"$%&'()!!"#$!!"!!"#$%"&  
 
4.2.13 Advantages and Drawbacks of Multiple Values 
The essential advantage of multiples is that they are uncomplicated and easy to use. 
PE funds will typically use multiples to give investors an indication of the returns of 
individual investments. A multiple value greater than one signals value creation. For 
instance, a multiple of 1,5 means a 50 % return on investment (Ellis et al., 2012). 
Another advantage is that multiples can be a good measurement of total value creation 
before final liquidation, especially through TVPI (Kocis et al., 2010).  
 
The most distinct drawback of the multiple method is that it takes no account of the 
timing of drawdowns and distributions over the fund's lifetime, thus neglecting the 
time value of money. A multiple will not provide an indication of how time effective 
investments were made. For example, a multiple of 1,5 delivered over a ten-year span 
does not demonstrate an especially strong achievement, in terms of the implied 
geometric annual return (Ellis et al., 2012). Therefore, an investor should know the 
investment duration when analyzing fund performance using multiples. Another 
critique concerning this method is the fact that little information about the underlying 
risk profile is provided to investors. However, this challenge applies to other 
measures of return for PE funds and other non-traded assets as well.  
 
4.2.14 Public Market Equivalent (PME) 
The public market equivalent (PME) is a measure that helps investors compare 
returns across different asset classes. Given the nature of the IRR, it is not convenient 
to match it to more standard measures of return used for stocks and bonds. PME is a 
measure that makes it appropriate to compare IRRs to public markets. This technique 
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allows investors to match IRRs with returns yielded by public markets over the same 
timing of cash flows.  
 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) introduced PME, which is an alternative measure of return 
based solely on cash flows. The method is an expanded version of TVPI where the 
fund is compared to a market index. An earlier, but slightly different measurement 
method that also used to be called public market equivalent, was introduced by Long 
and Nickels (1996). As proposed by Long (2008), this method now goes by the name 
ACG Index Comparison Method.  
 
By discounting the cash flows with public market returns, e.g. S&P 500, across the 
same time period, we can find the PME, reflecting the PE return relative to other 
investment vehicles (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). PME estimates the cash flows 
between the fund and LPs. These cash flows are separated into positive and negative 
cash flows, called distributions and capital calls. Distributions are cash flows, net of 
fees, returned to the LPs by the fund. Capital calls are LPs investments into the fund, 
including management fees. Distributions and capital calls are then discounted by the 
realized market return over the equivalent time period, and PME is the ratio between 
these two figures: 
 
!"# = !"#$ !1+ !! !!"##$ !1+ !! !!  
 
Where dist is distributions, rM is the realized market return from fund inception (t=0), 
and calls is called capital. 
 
This way LPs can easily see how their funds would have performed if they had 
invested differently. The two main asset classes that PE fund performance is 
compared to are fixed income securities and public equities (Ellis et al., 2012). It 
should be put some thought into deciding which index to use in the PME calculation 
as different funds are comparable to different indices. It might, for example, be 
natural to use S&P500 as a benchmark for some funds, but NASDAQ or OSEBX for 
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other funds. Using an inappropriate index as comparable might give a misleading 
picture of a fund's performance (Kocis et al., 2010). For the two most essential asset 
classes it is usually appropriate to use ‘total return’ indices, which accounts for 
coupon payments and dividends. Previous research by Gottschalg et al. (2010) 
suggests, however, that PE fund performance can be driven by sector selection. If this 
is the case, the investor may wish to use the PME method not based on an index as a 
whole, but compose a specific and representative index of the related industry mix.     
 
A prerequisite for the PME to measure the true risk-adjusted return has been that the β 
must be equal to 1. Specifically, it will be overstated if the beta is higher than 1, i.e. 
higher risk compared to the market, or understated with a beta lower than 1 (Kaplan 
and Schoar, 2005). According to Sorensen and Jagannathan (2013) however, given 
three assumptions, it is not necessary with a beta equal to 1. These assumptions are 
frictionless market and the ”law-of-one-price,” that the LP has a log-utility, and that 
the LP's wealth portfolio grows at the public market return. Hence, they argue that 
with these neither very controversial nor restrictive assumptions, PME can be 
considered a good performance measure independent of the risk.  
 
4.2.15 Advantages and Drawbacks of PME 
Unlike IRR, the PME does not include an underlying assumption that distributions are 
reinvested in any particular way. Another advantage is that PME is robust to the 
timing of cash flows. With IRR, the GP can manipulate the performance figure by the 
timing of cash flows, but this type of behavior will not affect the PME. (Sorensen and 
Jagannathan, 2013). Additionally, it is a measure easy to interpret. A PME greater 
than 1 tells us that the PE fund has achieved good returns relative to the comparable 
index, whereas a PME lower than 1 indicates a poor performance relative to the index 
(Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). However, this interpretation may not always be accurate, 
due to the interaction between the timing of the cash flows and the timing of the 
market returns. 
 
There are several drawbacks related to the PME method. A potential problem in the 
calculation of PME is caused by the usage of realized returns. The amount of noise of 
these returns can be significant and may lead to highly misleading PME figures. As 
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such, PME can be subject to manipulation. Furthermore, while IRR and PME are 
comparable, the two measures still contain different characteristics. For example, 
PME makes no adjustment for the illiquid nature of PE investments. Moreover, these 
are absolute measures of performance, and do not advise the investor on how to 
allocate capital among different asset classes (Ellis et al., 2012).  
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5. Previous Research 
There are certain factors that must be highlighted when evaluating previous research. 
It is, for instance, important to be aware of the kind of data the results are based on 
and what strengths and weaknesses this data contains. A predominant challenge when 
analyzing PE performance is the limited availability of data. Unlisted companies are 
not legally obligated to report performance data, thus research must be based on 
voluntary reporting by PE funds.  
 
A potential weakness of research based on databases with voluntary reporting (such 
as Preqin and Thomson Reuters) is the lack of ability to check whether the reported 
figures are correct. Many of these databases do, however, require performance 
reporting by both GPs and LPs, to facilitate detection of any manipulation.  
 
We will now give a brief description of some previous studies on zombie funds. 
 
5.1 Robinson and Sensoy, 2012 
Robinson and Sensoy (2012) (hereafter R&S) use a proprietary, confidential dataset 
gathered from a large, institutional LP with extensive investments in PE. Their sample 
consists of 837 PE funds with vintage years ranging from 1984 to 2009. The funds 
included are U.S. located funds. They represent 34,4 % of the VC pool and 55,7 % of 
the BO pool over this time period, and can thus be said to account for a significant 
portion of the documented PE-universe. The representativeness of this sample can be 
a concern as the information is obtained from one single LP. R&S compared the data 
to that of commercially available databases (such as Preqin and Cambridge 
Associates), without finding evidence that the performance of BO funds differ 
significantly. However, the performance of VC funds is somewhat below that 
reported in commercially available databases.  
 
R&S investigate if there is a connection between the fee structure of PE funds and the 
incentive to exit investments late. They find that incentives for delayed exit arise 
when the basis for the management fee changes to be based on net invested capital at 
some point during the fund duration, which it does for a third of the funds included in 
their dataset. This means that management fees are calculated on the ground of total 
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equity investments minus the cost basis of realized, exited investments. One rationale 
behind this fee basis is for LPs to avoid paying fees for investments that are no longer 
managed by the GPs. However, this fee structure means that exiting investments will 
reduce the base of capital on which GPs earn management fees, giving incentives for 
delaying liquidation and holding on to zombie investments. According to R&S, no 
systematic evidence exists on whether GPs actually behave this way. They find 
evidence that funds whose fee basis changes from committed capital to net invested 
capital are indeed more likely to exit investments later.  
 
5.2 Migliorini, 2014 
Migliorini (2014) (hereafter M) used data from Preqin and further drew on insights 
from interviews with LPs and service providers such as lawyers and placement agents 
for his research. Unfortunately, M does not state the number of interviews conducted, 
so little can be said about the strengths and weaknesses of this information. A possible 
validity problem can arise if too few interviews were included, and if these were 
influenced by highly subjective opinions. 
 
M's research is aimed at providing an overview to be used by both GPs and LPs 
facing the issues of zombie funds. M finds that zombie funds are a sharply increasing 
phenomenon that brings along a number of problems. Chief among these issues, M 
states the lack of resources to execute a fund's mandate, misalignment of interests 
between GPs and LPs, and capital trapped in non-performing funds. He further goes 
on to list possible long- and short-term solutions to the misalignment of interest 
problem, which is discussed in detail in the previous ‘agency problems in PE’ section.  
 
M found the financial crisis of 2007-2008, in addition to the record fundraising in the 
GP community leading up to the crisis paired with reduced capital allocation 
following the crisis, to exacerbate the zombie fund issue.  
 
According to M, the main issue brought about by zombie funds is the GP incentive to 
keep non-performing funds alive to squeeze as much money out of it as possible. This 
is achieved through the continuance of charged management fees, and may not be in 
the best interest of the LP. The short term solutions discussed in the ‘agency problems 
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in PE’ section is aimed at resolving conflicts of interest once a zombie situation has 
materialized. M lists the long-term solutions as a guide for avoiding investing in a 
potential zombie fund. Interestingly, the interviews conducted by M showed that LPs 
do not necessarily show more involvement despite the sharp rise in the number of 
zombie funds for the last five/six years. The stated reason being that LPs do not have 
the time and resources to deal with zombie funds given the relative size of their 
exposure and the reputational damages that may follow an intervention. 
 
5.3 Pedersen and Sand, 2014      
Pedersen and Sand (2014) (hereafter P&S) base their research on two databases of PE 
funds with vintage years from 1998 to 2007 and from 2008 to 2014, both extracted 
from Preqin. Their data is restricted to only include Nordic private equity funds. More 
specifically, funds with headquarters in the Nordic region are included, regardless of 
where their investment focus lies. P&S state that well performing funds will have 
incentives to report performance data, while poor performing funds will not. To 
prevent any consequently bias in their research, they use different exit types as a 
measure of a fund's success (e.g. IPO or trade sale etc.). They claim that this prevents 
any violation of the random sampling assumption in their regression analysis. 
 
266 Nordic PE funds are included in P&S's research. They apply the same zombie 
fund definition as Preqin to identify 80 potential zombie funds in the included sample. 
This constitutes a 30,1 % of the included funds.  
 
The 80 identified potential zombie funds amounts to $4 365 bn worth of PE assets in 
terms of committed capital. P&S further observed two periods, in terms of vintage 
distributions, with a significant increase in the number of zombie funds. These 
periods were the leads up to the dot-com bubble of 2000 and the financial crisis of 
2007-2008. Another finding was that the majority of the identified zombie funds were 
VC funds, but also a significant amount was BO funds. Moreover, P&S found that 
Iceland and Denmark are small players regarding the number funds raised between 
1998 and 2007 that later turned zombie, while zombie funds are evenly distributed in 
Norway, Sweden and Finland.  
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P&S further found that zombie funds are a significant and increasing problem in the 
PE industry. They are characterized by inferior performance and most frequently 
strikes funds with a small amount of committed capital.   
 
5.4 Summary  
Empirical research on zombie funds is limited. Literature and empirical research 
focusing explicitly on zombie funds is scarce at best. What can be agreed upon is that 
zombie funds have emerged as a PE industry problem with great potential 
ramifications. We therefore wish to provide insight into this field by providing 
descriptive statistics on global zombie fund effects.  
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6. Methodology  
Research builds on curiosity and the search for further knowledge on a given topic. 
Scientific research is the method of collecting data to derive information, for the 
purpose of using this information to aid rational decision-making. The research 
process typically consists of four steps: planning, acquiring, analyzing and 
disseminating relevant data (Sachdeva, 2009). This section elaborates on the tools we 
have used to describe and analyze the relevant data. We will now describe the 
preparation and data collection phase, as well as an analysis of the included dataset. 
Furthermore, we will present reliability and validity, in addition to some potential 
biases of the research. Lastly, the methods used for analysis will be defined.  
 
6.1 Research Design 
It is important to clarify the purpose of the study before preparing the research design. 
This research is mainly related to personal goals as we have developed a great interest 
in the field and want to learn more about PE zombie funds. There is limited empirical 
research on this phenomenon and we wish to investigate the global PE zombie fund 
market. Recent interviews show an increased awareness among institutional investors 
related to zombie fund problems, a problem that has seen a rapid growth since the in 
the recent years (Pedersen and Sand, 2014). Despite this growing attention, research 
that mainly focuses on zombie funds is scarce. We therefore wish to complement the 
existing literature on this exciting subject.  
 
This study will focus on the hypothetico-deductive model where research proceeds by 
formulating a hypothesis that can be falsified by a test on observable data. The 
hypotheses can be based on assumptions, calculations and intuition. We will use 
calculations based on market data and intuition to established hypotheses. The issues 
will then be tested with empirical data to either refute the original hypothesis or 
strengthen it. It should be noted that this method cannot confirm any hypotheses, only 
enhance them. As it proves difficult to confirm a scientific theory no matter how large 
amounts of data one has (Popper, 2012), these tests will focus on finding debilitating 
evidence. It is desirable to be able to generalize any potential findings. 
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We wish to examine the performance of zombie funds based on historical data. We 
will use both cross-sectional surveys and panel data. Cross-sectional studies are used 
to compare differences among subjects at a given point in time, and can provide 
information on variations between zombie funds distinguished by different 
characteristics such as fund type and size. Analysis with panel data deals with cross-
sectional time series. Data is collected over time and on the same subjects before a 
regression model is run over both dimensions, which can provide insight on zombie 
fund performance.  
 
6.2 Data  
There are two main sources of data for quantitative research, primary sources and 
secondary sources. The researcher collects primary data through methods such as 
surveys, direct observations, interviews and logs. Obtaining primary data may yield 
more reliable results, as the researcher has obtained and analyzed the data himself, 
securing quality. Secondary data is edited primary data, which is already available in 
journals, books and databases. Secondary sources can contain valuable information, 
but one should think carefully about what information one is looking for before 
starting the actual query as this data was collected for another purpose than the 
problem at hand (Sachdeva, 2009).  
 
We have chosen to use secondary data from the Preqin database. More specifically, 
data is obtained from four databases within Preqin: Funds in Market, Fund Manager 
Profile, Performance Analyst and Investor Intelligence. Our population represents all 
zombie funds globally, of which our sample is limited to the data reported to Preqin. 
The ideal criterion for sample selection is to reflect the total population in a correct 
manner, so that the results found from the sample can be inferred to represent the 
entire population (Lewis et al., 2012).  
 
Preqin has since its founding in 2003 been the leading source of data and intelligence 
for the alternative asset classes industry (Preqin, 2015b). More than 24 000 
professionals in over 94 countries use their products and services. PE is one of the 
asset classes that Preqin provides data and information on, with said data 
encompassing the following areas: fund and fundraising, performance, fund 
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managers, institutional investors, deals and fund terms. We chose Preqin as its data 
reaches back to 1980 and contains information on over 20 000 of PE funds 
worldwide. Preqin has, compared to competitor benchmarks, more than 1 000 
additional funds reporting data (Preqin, 2013c).  
 
Preqin gathers performance data through two methods; directly from GPs and through 
the Freedom of Information Act - which allows data collection directly from LPs. 
Each of these methods accounts for 50 % of the gathered data (Preqin, 2013c). Since 
reporting is done on a voluntary basis, the data material may contain biases. GPs will 
not have incentives to report results when funds perform poor. LPs, on the other hand, 
are not subject to the same incentive and their reporting may to some degree 
neutralize this effect. This will be discussed in more detail in the reliability section.   
 
6.3 Reliability and Validity 
It is important that published results from any research can sustain investigation and 
verification. This applies to all aspects of the research, including sources used, 
methods used and conclusions reached. Reliability and validity are two concepts with 
the aim of ensuring quality and accuracy of the research. These two concepts will be 
examined below: 
 
6.3.1 Reliability 
Reliability is critical in quantitative research, and provides an indication of how 
reliable and accurate the data is in relation to collection and processing. Reliability is 
thus based on measurement precision or measurement error - which should be 
minimized to the highest degree possible. This concept refers to whether your 
findings are consistent if the same collection techniques and analytic process is 
repeated or replicated by another researcher (Lewis et al., 2012). Good reliability is 
present if the research yields the same findings each time it is used, regardless of who 
performs it. Information about reliability is important because it indirectly indicates 
what weight can be attributed to the results (Nygaard and Normann, 2008).  
 
According to Preqin, there is no selection bias in the reported data as it is gathered 
from both GPs and LPs, to make sure the benchmark will not be too heavily 
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influenced by either request. It has been suggested that the requirement of reliability 
can, to some extent, be difficult to satisfy with respect to databases containing 
selection bias. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) believe that funds performing extraordinary 
good or bad will have little motivation to report their results. They do, however, fail 
to confirm these hypotheses through research and cannot conclude whether GPs 
actually behave this way. Funds with low or negative returns will not wish to report 
results as this may lower the chances for collecting follow-on funds. If this is indeed 
the case, it will create a positive or negative bias in average returns. Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005) believe that if there is a bias, it would most likely take the form of 
underreporting by the worse performing funds. Given the relationship between 
zombie funds and performance, which we will address later in this thesis, it is 
reasonable to assume that most zombie funds are among the poor performers. 
According to the previous rationale, this suggests that GPs operating zombie funds 
have little incentive to report performance data. LPs, on the contrary, do not share this 
view, as they are not concerned with raising additional funds.  
 
6.3.2 Validity 
Validity indicates the extent to which the data represents the phenomenon one wants 
to measure. It is the degree to which the data measures what it claims to measure. 
Three forms of validity have been identified to secure the quality of research: 
construct validity, internal validity and external validity (Lewis et al., 2012).  
 
Construct validity regards the extent to which research measures actually measure 
what they intend to estimate. This is a highly relevant concern regarding empirical 
research. An important question is therefore whether the data obtained from Preqin 
can be used to evaluate zombie fund performance. Construct validity is a typical 
measure phenomenon and can therefore not be viewed as absolute, but rather as a 
quality requirement approximately fulfilled (Kintel and Knudsen, 2014). More 
precisely, we never know whether this validity is obtained and how big a problem it 
poses. The assessment is in some instances done using common sense, which is 
referred to as ‘face validity’. We have obtained performance data on zombie funds 
from the global market set up against hypotheses concerning performance of zombie 
funds in the same market.  
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Harris et al. (2013) suggest that when data is obtained from GPs, or at least in part 
from GPs, it is possible for GPs to strategically stop reporting and cause the results to 
be out of date. It would be optimal with performance information on more of the 
zombie funds found in Preqin. Of 1 274 identified zombie funds, recent performance 
data is found for only a part of them. Some funds do not report at all, while other 
funds have not reported for several years. Furthermore, although Preqin has summary 
performance data (IRR and multiples), cash flow data can only be found for a subset 
of these funds. This is mainly obtained from public investors subject to the Freedom 
of Information Act (Harris et al., 2013). Access to cash flow information might 
provide higher quality data. Another possible negative aspect of the data may be that 
the results and characteristics of the reporting fund investors might deviate from the 
average investor, thus giving a false image of the industry (Kintel and Knudsen, 
2014).  
 
Internal validity, or measurement validity, is related to the causality between our 
variables, i.e. if we observe causal relationship between our variables. As this is a 
descriptive study, a causal conclusion cannot be warranted (Lewis et al., 2012).  
External validity regards the extent to which the results can be generalized across time 
and space to relevant contexts (Lewis et al., 2012). Preqin's database is large and 
consists of funds from all over the world. Fund characteristics from other databases 
are similar across the world (Kintel and Knutsen, 2014), thus it is reasonable to 
assume that findings obtained from similar databases would provide comparable 
results.  
 
6.4 Potential Biases      
We will now discuss some potential biases of the data. 
 
6.4.1 Omitted Variable Bias 
This bias occurs when a relevant variable is omitted from a model. The model 
outcome can be biased if the omitted variable is correlated with the included 
independent variables, and if the omitted variable is a determinant of the dependent 
variable. This is typically a possible issue with any analytical model.  
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6.4.2 Sample Selection Bias 
Sample selection bias occurs when one applies a non-randomly selected data for 
statistical analysis. This could be the case if only GPs reported data based on the 
reporting incentives discussed above. The result would lead to the use of a non-
random sample that might not be representative of the entire population. As already 
mentioned, no research has been able prove that GPs act in a way to omit reporting 
for poor performing funds, and our dataset is collected from both GPs and LPs.  
 
6.4.3 Survivorship Bias 
Survivorship bias (also called survival bias) is the logical error that occurs when 
concentration is focused on the people or things that “survived” a process and 
overlooking those that did not due to their lack of visibility. This bias can lead to false 
results if those observations that did not “survive” are systematically excluded from 
the sample. 
 
6.5 Methods of Analysis 
We will now review the methods we have chosen for the analysis of zombie funds. 
The purpose is to provide an overview of what the various methods express and what 
assumptions underlie the use of them.  
 
6.5.1 Multiple Regression 
Regression is a dependency model, with the aim of explaining the variation in a 
certain variable as a function of explanatory variables. It is a statistical technique that 
attempts to explain the change in one variable, called the dependent variable, as a 
function of a set of variables called independent variables. An ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression model can be written as: 
 !! = ß! + ß!!!! + ß!!!! +⋯+ ß!!!" + !! 
     
Yi is here the dependent variable that we want to explain, and Yi is supposed to be 
explained by the explanatory variables X1i through XKi. εi express the stochastic error 
term. A regression model uses the variation in the independent variables to explain 
variation in Yi. Any variation that is not explained by the independent variables is 
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captured by the stochastic error term. The terms β0, β1, β2 and βK are called regression 
coefficients, and attempts to isolate the effect on Yi of a change in one variable from 
the effect on Yi of changes in other variables. β1 will, for example, give the change in 
Yi as X1i increased by one unit. A major advantage of multiple regression is its ability 
to measure the effect a single variable has on Yi when all other variables are held 
constant. The parameters of this model are based on the ceteris paribus assumption, to 
indicate that influence from other variables cannot be excluded (Aassve, 2011; Stock 
and Watson, 2012).  
   
A regression analysis will not say anything about causality between two or more 
variables, it will only test the strength and direction of the quantitative relationship. 
Demonstration of causality is a logical and experimental problem, not a statistical 
one. It is thus important to be aware of the fact that even if regression techniques are 
employed, one will not necessarily get causal effects (Aassve, 2011). It is important to 
note that the result of a multiple regression is extremely sensitive to the combination 
of independent variables included in the analysis. A very important explanatory 
variable in regression estimation will depend on other explanatory variables chosen 
for the analysis. If the interesting variable is the only one explaining something 
important about the dependent variable, it will appear as crucial. If, on the other hand, 
the interesting variable is one of several variables with explanatory power, it will 
usually be perceived as less important (Pallant, 2005; Kintel and Knudsen, 2014).  
 
6.5.2 Assumptions Underlying Multiple Regression 
Gujarati (2003) gives ten underlying assumptions for the classical linear regression 
model (CLRM): the regression model in linear in the parameters, Xi is assumed to be 
non stochastic, zero mean value of disturbance, εi, homoscedasticity or equal variance 
of εi, no autocorrelation between the disturbances, zero covariance between the 
residual, εi, and the independent variable, Xi, the number of observations n must be 
greater than the number of parameters to be estimated, variability in Xi values, the 
regression model is correctly specified and there is no perfect multicollinearity. 
However, all these assumptions are not strictly necessary for consistent estimation of 
parameters. CLMR (OLS) needs one thing and that is orthogonality of residuals and 
regressors. The residuals serve as the unexplained variation in Yi, and if they are not 
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orthogonal to Xi more explanation can be extracted from Xi by a different choice of 
coefficients (Cottrell, 2011). One can never be certain whether this assumption is 
satisfied, however, it is assumed when running OLS regressions.  
 
6.5.3 Generalized Least Squares Regression 
Generalized least squares (GLS) regression is a technique used to estimate the 
unknown parameters in a linear regression model. If the variances of the observations 
are unequal (display heteroscedasticity) or if a certain degree of correlation is present 
between the observations, ordinary least squares (OLS) can yield inaccurate 
inferences. The move from OLS to GLS is thus a way to correct for autocorrelation 
(McGill, 2012). The difference of the two models is in the error term. More 
specifically, it is expected that the assumptions about the residuals are different. OLS 
gives the maximum likelihood estimate for βi when the parameters have equal 
variance and is uncorrelated, and the error term is white. GLS allows the same 
approach to be generalized to give the maximum likelihood estimate of βi when the 
error term is colored (heteroscedasticity). The GLS equation is identical to the OLS 
equation with the exception of the error term (McGill, 2012). 
 
6.5.4 Assumptions Underlying GLS Regression 
The main difference separating GLS from OLS is the property that residuals need not 
follow the same assumptions as those required for OLS analysis. GLS is as such a 
generalization of the OLS model that relaxes the assumptions that the residuals are 
homoscedastic and uncorrelated. GLS assumes that Var(ε) = σ2Ω, where the last term 
represents an n*n symmetric and invertible matrix. The diagonal elements of this 
matrix indicate the error variances for each case while the off-diagonal elements 
specify the error correlations for each pair of cases. All the other classical 
assumptions hold while heteroscedasticity and/ or autocorrelation is allowed for. 
(McGill, 2012) 
 
6.5.5 Logistic Regression 
Logistic regression, also called logit regression, is a test for analyzing a dataset in 
which there are one or more independent variables that determine an outcome. The 
outcome is measured with a dichotomous variable, i.e. a variable that only has two 
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possible outcomes. The test aims at finding the best fitting model to describe the 
relationship between the dichotomous dependent variable and a set of independent 
variables (MedCalc, 2015). Logit regression generates the coefficients of a formula to 
predict a logit transformation of the probability of presence of the dependent variable.  
 
6.5.6 Assumptions Underlying Logistic Regression 
Logit regression does not require many of the key assumptions of linear regression, 
particularly those regarding linearity, normality, homoscedasticity and measurement 
level. However, some other assumptions still apply. 
 
Assumption 1 - The true conditional probabilities are a logistic function of the 
independent variables. 
 
Assumption 2 - No important variables are omitted. No extraneous variables are 
included. 
 
Assumption 3 - The independent variables are measured without error. 
 
Assumption 4 - The observations are independent. 
 
Assumption 5 - The independent variables are not linear combinations of each other.  
 
6.5.7 Kruskal-Wallis H-Test  
The Kruskal-Wallis H test is a rank based nonparametric test that is used to test for 
statistically significant differences between two or more groups of an independent 
variable (Lærd Statistics, 2015), and is such an extension of the Mann-Whitney U test 
to allow for comparison between more than two independent groups. This test can be 
applied when one wants to compare three or more data series coming from different 
groups. For instance, this test can be used investigate whether attitudes towards pay 
discrimination differ based on job position. Attitudes should then be measured on an 
ordinal scale.  
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It is important to note that the Kruskal-Wallis test is an omnibus test statistic and 
therefore cannot tell which specific groups are statistically significant from others. It 
only tells that at least two groups differ from each other. As more than two groups are 
typically included for this test, it is important to be able to determine which groups 
are different. If the Kruskal-Wallis test indicates a difference, one can carry out a 
post-hoc test (Lærd Statistics, 2015). A post-hoc test compares two and two groups to 
determine whether differences exist between these groups.  
 
6.5.8 Assumptions Underlying the Kruskal-Wallis Test 
Assumption 1 - The dependent variable should be measured at the ordinal or 
continuous level, i.e. interval or ratio. 
 
Assumption 2 - The independent variable should consist of two or more categorical, 
independent groups. The Kruskal-Wallis test is usually applied when one has three or 
more independent groups, but can also be used when one has two groups. However, 
the Mann-Whitney U test is more common to test for difference between two groups.  
 
Assumption 3 - There should be independence of observations. This means that there 
should be no relationship between the observations in each group or between the 
groups themselves.  
 
Assumption 4 - One must be able to determine whether the distributions in each group 
have the same shape (variability) in order to interpret the results.  
 
6.5.9 Chi-square Test 
A Chi-square test is applied when one has two categorical variables from a single 
population. The test is used to determine whether there is a significant association 
between these two variables. It could, for instance, be used to test for independence to 
determine whether gender is related to voting preferences. The Chi-square test is used 
to discover if there is a significant relationship between two categorical variables. The 
test compares the observed data to a model that distributes the data according to the 
expectation that the variables are independent. 
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6.5.10 Assumptions Underlying the Chi-square Test 
Assumption 1 - The two variables should be measured at an ordinal or nominal level, 
i.e. categorical data. 
 
Assumption 2 - The two variables should consist of two or more categorical, 
independent groups.  
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7. Characteristics and Returns of Zombie Funds 
We will now look at different characteristics of zombie funds and how they perform. 
We first review zombie fund characteristics such as fund types, fund size, vintage 
years, region focus, fund location and industry focus. We then consider IRR and 
several multiples of zombie funds, before these measures are compared to those of PE 
non-zombie funds.  Our data sample is collected from Preqin. As will be mentioned, 
not all identified zombie funds report performance. However, data concerning fund 
type, region focus, location and industry focus is disclosed for all zombies in our 
database and should not create the same potential for biasedness.  
 
7.1 Zombie Funds 
A total of 1 274 zombie funds were identified in the Preqin database. These are funds 
with vintage years ranging from 2003 to 2008 that have not successfully raised a 
follow on fund between 2009 and 2015. No liquidated funds are included in this 
sample. Liquidated funds are not active and thus fall outside the zombie fund 
definition. All the 1 274 funds are of status “closed”, meaning that no further capital 
can be committed. Furthermore, funds in the categories Funds of Funds, Secondaries 
and Co-invest Multi-manager are excluded from the data set. This is because we only 
classify direct PE fund types as zombie funds. A PE fund of funds holds a portfolio of 
other PE funds rather than investing directly in portfolio companies. PE secondaries 
involve trading pre-existing investor commitments in PE. Co-investing means that 
one fund makes a minority investment directly into a company, alongside other PE 
funds. Multi-manager is another way of referring to funds of funds. Therefore, co-
invest multi-manager cannot be included in the data set as a direct PE investment. 
These fund classes are clearly not direct PE fund types and are thus excluded from the 
zombie fund group.  
 
A potential drawback of excluding funds that are liquidated within our sample period 
is the possibility of survivorship bias. It might be that by not including liquidated 
funds, we are not correctly tracking the performance of all funds. Instead, only those 
funds that remain active are tracked. In total, 93 funds are excluded as they are 
liquidated. Of these funds, we identify 26 funds that could be classified as potential 
zombie funds. However, we do not have information about the time of liquidation and 
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cannot be certain as to whether these 26 funds should be included as zombies or if 
they are correctly excluded from the zombie group. Given the criteria of the zombie 
fund definition and above argument, we choose to include only active funds. This 
makes the presence of survivorship bias a possibility. Nevertheless, these funds 
represent only 2,00 % of our total sample of zombie funds. Note that this should be 
kept in mind when interpreting the results.  
 
It should be pointed out that the identified zombie funds are more correctly classified 
as ´potential´ zombie funds. There is a possibility that some funds follow an abnormal 
strategic plan, e.g. an investment horizon exceeding the seven-year standard without 
plans of raising a successor fund. For convenience, we will simply label these funds 
as zombie funds throughout this thesis.   
 
There is a range of different fund types found within the extracted zombie funds. The 
1 274 funds can be distinguished into 18 different categories. The following table 
outlines the fund types and the number of zombie funds belonging to each of them. 
For convenience, we have chosen to gather similar fund types into larger groups. 
Early stage, early stage: seed and early stage: start-up are combined into one early 
stage group, consisting of 242 funds. Furthermore, venture (general) and venture debt 
is combined to represent 385 funds.  
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Fund Type Zombies Non-Zombies 
Balanced 33 2,59 % 68 2,32 % 
Buyout 293 23,00 % 892 30,44 % 
Co-investment 14 1,10 % 63 2,15 % 
Distressed Debt 9 0,71 % 85 2,90 % 
Early Stage 152 11,93 % 277 9,45 % 
Early Stage: Seed 51 4,00 % 69 2,35 % 
Early Stage: Start-up 39 3,06 % 69 2,35 % 
Sum Early Stage 242 19,00 % 415 14,16 % 
Expansion / Late Stage 70 5,49 % 94 3,21 % 
Growth 120 9,42 % 297 10,14 % 
Infrastructure 1 0,08 % 0 0,00 % 
Mezzanine 52 4,08 % 181 6,18 % 
Natural Resources 21 1,65 % 75 2,56 % 
Real Estate 0 0,00 % 1 0,03 % 
Special Situations 20 1,57 % 66 2,25 % 
Timber 7 0,55 % 35 1,19 % 
Turnaround 7 0,55 % 43 1,47 % 
Venture (General) 380 29,83 % 594 20,27 % 
Venture Debt 5 0,39 % 21 0,72 % 
Sum Venture 385 30,22 % 615 20,99 % 
Sum 1274   2930   
Table 1: Fund Types 
 
As evident from the above table, the largest number of zombie funds can be found in 
the VC category. This type represents 385 funds, a figure amounting to 30,22 % of 
the identified zombie funds. This finding is true for the Nordic PE market as well, 
where a majority of identified zombie funds are VC funds (Pedersen and Sand, 2014). 
The second largest group of zombie funds is found within the BO type. 293 zombies 
are represented here, constituting 23,00 % of the total figure. The third largest 
category is the combined early stage group with 242 zombie funds, which is 19,00 % 
of the total figure. The last fund type containing a substantial number of zombie funds 
is growth. 120 zombie funds belong to this fund type, yielding 9,42 % of the total 
amount. For the rest of the fund types, the number of identified zombie funds is 
significantly lower. None of the remaining fund types show zombie funds exceeding 
100. Mezzanine represents the largest number here, but its 52 zombie funds only 
amount to 4,08 % of all zombies. Infrastructure, timber, turnaround and distressed 
debt stand out as fund types where a particularly low number of zombie funds are 
represented.  
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The average zombie fund size is $233,75 mn, where BO funds are substantially larger 
(measured in committed capital) than VC funds with an average size of $403,12 mn 
compared to $123,42 mn. Early stage funds are on average smaller than BO and VC 
funds with mean committed capital of $80,03 mn. $181,69 mn is the average size of 
growth funds. It should be emphasized that fund size is a constant figure, i.e. it is 
based on final close of committed capital and is not affected by returns or 
distributions. Furthermore, paid-in capital does not affect our fund size variable.  
 
Figure 7 shows the number of funds started in each of the included zombie fund 
required vintage years. The number of zombie fund start-ups is more modest in 2003, 
with a relatively stable increase in the years that follow until 2008. The global 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 represents the vintage years with the largest number of 
zombie fund start-ups, including 261 and 271 zombies respectively.  
 
*
Figure 7: Overview of the number of fund start-ups from 2003-2008 
 
The following table outlines the region focus of the 1 274 identified zombie funds. A 
fund's region focus is where its investment activity occurs and where its acquired 
portfolio companies reside. This table seems to suggest that the largest portion of 
zombie funds focus their investments in the U.S. 603 funds, which is equivalent to 
123* 176* 203* 240* 261* 271*
283* 331*
503* 586* 673* 554*
0*100*
200*300*
400*500*
600*700*
800*900*
1000*
2003* 2004* 2005* 2006* 2007* 2008*
Number'of'funds'
Vintage'Year'
Fund'start4ups'by'vintage'year'
Non@Zombies*Zombies*
* 71*
47,33 % of the 1 274 zombie funds, target portfolio companies in the U.S. 
Furthermore, the table indicates that Europe is the second largest region of focus for 
zombie funds. 356 zombie funds base their investments in Europe, amounting to 
27,94 % of the total figure. Additionally, a significant portion of zombie funds focus 
on the Asian market. This figure is 151 funds and constitutes 11,85 % of all zombies. 
The number of zombie funds focusing on the Americas, Australia, Middle East and 
Israel, and multi-regions is of less significance. This observation is as expected and 
conforms to the relative sizes of the PE markets in the different regions. The largest 
PE market in the world is found in the U.S., followed by Europe and then Asia.  
 
Region Focus Zombies Non-Zombies 
Africa 45 3,53 % 71 2,42 % 
Americas 23 1,81 % 71 2,42 % 
Asia 151 11,85 % 553 18,87 % 
Australasia 38 2,98 % 59 2,01 % 
Diversified Multi-Regional 12 0,94 % 34 1,16 % 
Europe 356 27,94 % 714 24,37 % 
Middle East & Israel 46 3,61 % 77 2,63 % 
US 603 47,33 % 1351 46,11 % 
Sum 1274   2930   
Table 2: Region Focus 
 
The location of the GP team may not always be the same as the fund's region focus. 
An investment team may be located in Asia while at the same time specialize and 
invest in U.S. companies. As one might expect, GPs of zombie funds are located in 
countries all over the world. The important extraction from the data is that the U.S. 
once again emerges with the highest frequency (see appendix 2). Out of the 1 274 
zombie funds, 581 are located in the U.S. In effect, 45,60 % of all zombie funds are 
based there. Comparing this figure to the 603 zombie funds with investment focus in 
the U.S., it is evident that some funds invest in the U.S. while being based elsewhere. 
The second largest location of zombie fund GPs is the U.K., where 78 zombie funds 
can be found. Other European countries such as Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and 
the Netherlands also inhabit a relative large portion of zombie funds. Furthermore, 
worth mentioning is that Australia, Canada, China, and Japan are countries where 
respectively 33, 37, 30 and 29 zombie funds are located.  
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A substantial segment of the zombie funds are diversified funds (see appendix 3). A 
fund's industry focus concerns what market its portfolio companies operate in, and a 
diversified fund acquires portfolio companies engaging in several industries. 624 
zombie funds are classified as diversified. Furthermore, a large portion of the zombie 
funds, 229 to be exact, focus on the IT and technology industry. 144 zombie funds 
invest in health and biotechnology businesses. The classification of the zombie fund 
industry focus is based on the market in which the fund's primary focus lies, and a 
fund may not be limited to exclusively invest in IT companies even though its main 
expertise is IT. Communication and telecom, consumer and retail, and industrial 
investments are also industries in which a relative large amount of zombie funds base 
their business, with 60, 58 and 47 funds respectively identified in each category.   
 
We will mainly focus on IRR and multiples as determinants of performance. The lack 
of detailed cash flow data on individual funds limits the possibility to investigate 
PME and MIRR. As previously described, IRR represents the average return on 
invested capital, given all cash inflows and outflows. As such, an investor is better off 
as the IRR increases. The IRR values for zombie funds will be presented as both 
equally weighted and capital weighted averages. The figures used in this analysis are 
those directly reported to Preqin, as the underlying cash flows are not available to us. 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) find that the IRR based on cash flows is strongly correlated 
with IRR reported by the Venture Economics database, with a correlation coefficient 
of 0,98. Furthermore, Harris et al. (2013) find that results based on data from Preqin 
and Venture Economics are generally consistent. Multiples also give insight into a 
fund's performance. The multiples in this analysis are those directly reported to 
Preqin. The ratios we will focus on are DPI, RVPI and TVPI. 
 
When calculating IRR for a not yet liquidated fund, the net asset value/ residual value 
(NAV) must be estimated. The treatment of NAV is a widely debated topic in 
calculation of PE returns. In previous research, the treatment of NAV has largely been 
solved in two different ways. The first and most often observed method treats NAV as 
an incoming cash flow at the end of the fund duration and is based on the assumption 
that NAV represents the market value of the fund. The other method writes down the 
NAV. This method is applied by Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) and Ljungqvist and 
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Richardson (2003). The first method has received critique as the lack of reliable 
market prices in the PE secondary market challenges whether NAV is a good measure 
of market value. Harris et al. (2013), on the other hand, argue that writing down NAV 
is the wrong procedure and will yield too low returns. As already mentioned, we use 
IRRs directly reported to and calculated by Preqin where IRR calculations are based 
on cash flows and valuation of unrealized assets.  
 
As previously discussed, performance data is reported to Preqin on a voluntary basis. 
Only a portion of the 1 274 identified zombie funds has reported performance data in 
recent years. Preqin contains performance data on 210 zombie funds in 2013, while 
the equivalent figure from 2014 is 208. It may not be the same funds reporting each 
year. We will look at figures from 2013 in this part, as these are year-end figures, 
while numbers reported in 2014 are reported in different quarters.  
 
Table 3 shows the performance based on IRR for the 210 zombie funds in our sample. 
The average return for all the funds as well as return for each fund type is presented. 
We display performance as equally weighted average, capital weighted average, 
median and upper and lower IRR.  
 
Table 3: Net IRR of zombie funds 
 
We find that zombie funds on average deliver an IRR of 2,56 %. This rate of return to 
investor is low when considering the risk profile of PE. The performance will later on 
be compared to that of non-zombie PE funds in the same time period. Furthermore, it 
is evident from the table that BO zombie funds clearly outperform VC zombie funds 
with an IRR of 6,09 % compared to a negative VC return of 1,82 %. After BO funds, 
growth funds provide the best return with a rate of 3,13 %. Other fund types yield an 
IRR 2,60 %, which is almost the average of all zombie funds, while early stage funds 
Net IRR (%) 
Zombie BO VC Early Stage Growth Others All 
Average 6,09 -1,82 1,12 3,13 2,60 2,56 
Capital Weighted Average 6,06 0,24 -2,02 3,31 8,28 5,62 
Median 5,30 -1,35 -1,90 1,90 5,90 2,90 
Min -25,60 -61,60 -20,70 -17,90 -19,30 -61,60 
Max 58,00 24,30 61,00 24,00 18,90 61,00 
Observations 77 56 26 16 35 210 
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provide an unsatisfactory IRR of 1,12 %. This information seems to support our 
suspicion that zombie funds underperform other PE funds, which will be explored 
later in this thesis.  
 
If we look to capital weighted IRR, we notice that some IRR figures change. Returns 
for BO and growth funds remain the same, while they increase or decrease for the 
remaining fund types resulting in a change of the total average. When the average is 
capital weighted, larger funds (those with highest amounts of committed capital) will 
affect the mean value more than smaller funds. The capital weighted average for early 
stage funds is negative 2,02 %, a reduction of 3,14 percentage points from the equally 
weighted figure. This means that one or some of the larger funds in the sample have 
performed worse than the smaller funds. The capital weighted averages for VC and 
other funds, on the other hand, represent an increase from the equally weighted 
averages. IRR for VC funds rise to 0,24 % while IRR for other funds rise to 8,28 %. 
For these two categories, larger funds have performed better than smaller funds, 
leading to an alteration of the IRR figures. The result on total average is an increase to 
a return of 5,62 %, a jump of 3,06 percentage points. This return, even though larger 
than before, may still not be satisfactory when one considers the lifetime and risk 
profile of PE investments.  
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Table 4: DPI, RVPI and TVPI of zombie funds 
 
If we look to the above table, we see equally weighted average and capital weighted 
average multiple values, in addition to median, upper and lower multiples. The 
multiples included are DPI, RVPI and TVPI, as these are indicators of a fund's 
performance. DPI is a ratio of cash distributed back to investors over cash paid in by 
investors. As a fund is closing in on the end of its life, most of the cash should be 
distributed back to investors. As evident from table 4, this is not the case for zombie 
funds. A DPI of, for instance, 50 % means that half of the capital paid in by investors 
has been returned. Ideally, DPI of liquidated funds should exceed 100 %, as positive 
returns should have been generated. The zombie funds have on average distributed 
41,69 % of the cash committed by investors. This value is low as most of the zombies 
exceed their expected lifetime, and more capital should have been distributed back to 
investors. The largest DPI value is observed for BO funds with an average of 54,81 % 
distributed capital. This conforms to the above findings that BO funds are those 
generating the highest IRR value. VC funds, with a substantially lower return, have 
distributed on average 32,98 % of cash received from investors. However, the lowest 
DPI, RVPI and TVPI (%) 
Zombie   BO VC Early Stage Growth Others All 
Average DPI 54,81 32,98 21,40 33,60 45,54 41,69 
  RVPI 65,21 69,80 100,47 78,96 70,60 72,40 
  TVPI 122,18 102,78 120,03 112,55 116,14 114,80 
Capital Weighted 
Average 
DPI 58,39 29,34 24,38 40,26 67,29 55,48 
RVPI 67,87 73,80 71,08 73,56 78,88 72,50 
TVPI 127,02 103,14 95,00 113,82 146,17 128,48 
Median DPI 43,90 29,00 16,05 7,20 42,70 30,15 
  RVPI 63,30 67,00 69,85 77,20 69,50 68,35 
  TVPI 116,05 95,40 87,25 101,90 117,80 108,55 
Min DPI 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
  RVPI 0,50 1,90 1,30 0,00 17,00 0,00 
  TVPI 18,80 8,20 3,80 38,90 44,00 3,80 
Max DPI 227,10 140,40 78,30 192,50 139,40 227,10 
  RVPI 199,00 372,80 706,00 138,60 133,20 706,00 
  TVPI 260,30 458,20 717,00 208,00 187,00 717,00 
Observations DPI 86 61 28 22 39 236 
  RVPI 82 61 24 22 39 228 
  TVPI 82 61 24 22 39 228 
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distribution rate is found within early stage funds. These funds have only distributed 
21,40 % of committed capital.  
 
RVPI provides insight on how a fund has created value before it is liquidated and cash 
is distributed to investors. It is a ratio that points to unrealized values of a fund. 
Average RVPI for the zombie funds in our dataset is 72,40 %. This means that 72,40 
% of committed capital is currently held values in the funds. The highest RVPI is 
found for early stage funds, whose average rate is 100,47 %. The lowest rate is found 
in BO funds whose average RVPI is 65,21 %. However, this ratio must be analyzed 
together with the DPI value to provide a clear picture of performance. As such, TVPI 
is a superior measure of return.  
 
TVPI combines DPI and RVPI to represent a measure of both the distributions and 
the residual values of a fund. This is the most common multiple to look at when 
determining total performance of PE funds (Fraser-Sampson, 2011). The average 
TVPI of all zombie funds is 114,80 %, indicating a slight increase in value. This 
figure will later be compared to an equivalent measure for non-zombie PE funds, to 
provide insight as to whether this TVPI is inferior to that achieved by other PE funds. 
The largest TVPI is of 122,18 % and represents the BO funds. Once again we see that 
the multiples and IRR values agree. The lowest TVPI is that of VC funds, with a rate 
of 102,78 %. As with equally weighted IRR, TVPI suggests that these funds are the 
worst performers.  
 
If we consider capital weighted multiples, we see that the total DPI increases to 55,48 
%. This indicates that some of the larger funds have distributed more cash to investors 
than some of the smaller funds in the sample. The largest capital weighted DPI is  
found for other funds and is 67,29 %. This is in accordance to the capital weighted  
IRR information as other funds provided the greatest return figure. The lowest DPI is 
found for the early stage funds, who have distributed 24,38 % on average. Once more, 
the multiples and IRR values tell the same story as early stage funds solely provided 
negative capital weighted returns.  
 
* 77*
The average TVPI for all fund types increases when one considers the capital 
weighted rate compared to the equally weighted one. TVPI for all zombie funds is 
128,48 %, an increase of 11,91 percentage points. This is an indication that some 
large funds perform better than some of the small funds in the sample. The largest 
TVPI is found for other funds, and the lowest for early stage funds, again providing 
the same information as the capital weighted IRR figures.  
 
The following table displays equivalent IRR information for non-zombie PE funds as 
table 5 outlines for zombie funds. The data is collected from Preqin and contains 
information on 2 930 funds. These funds have vintage years from 2003 to 2008, and 
represent the same fund types as those included in the zombie group. 
 
Table 5: Net IRR of non-zombie funds 
 
This table seems to strengthen the perception that zombie funds underperform other 
PE funds. In 2013, zombie funds had provided an average IRR of 2,56 % while other 
PE funds brought a return of 11,84 % the same period. PE BO funds provided a 8,25 
% better return than BO zombie funds, VC funds a 9,94 % better return than VC 
zombie funds, early stage funds a 9,74 % better return than zombie early stage funds, 
growth funds a 8,25 % better return than zombie growth funds and other funds a 7,01 
% better return than other zombie fund types. Together PE funds provided a superior 
return of 9,28 % compared to its zombie counterpart. Albeit this large difference in 
performance, the same fund types range more or less the same for zombie funds and  
non-zombie funds. BO funds perform best, followed by the growth category. The 
worst performance is by VC funds in both instances, even though zombie VC funds 
are the only funds providing a negative average return when means are equally 
weighted. The only difference in the ranking of the best and worst performers is that 
of early stage and other funds.  
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The capital weighted IRR values for the non-zombie funds show a reduction of the 
rates for most of the fund types. BO fund return decreases by 3,52 percentage points, 
early stage return decreases by 0,76 percentage points and growth return decreases by 
0,50 percentage points indicating an inferior performance by larger funds. VC fund 
return increases by 0,35 percentage points while other fund types increase their return 
by 0,09 percentage points. Together the effect is a 1,33 percentage points decrease in 
the overall IRR. The return gap is smaller between zombie funds and non-zombie 
funds when capital weighted IRRs are taken into account, yielding a reduced 
difference of 2,22 percentage points. Still, zombie funds are the worst performing 
funds. Comparing fund types, the capital weighted average IRRs of non-zombie funds 
are more persistent in value than those of the zombie funds who vary more. For the 
non-zombies, growth funds perform the best and VC funds the worst. This is not the 
same for the zombie funds where other fund types were found to exhibit the best 
returns and early stage funds the worst returns.  
!
Table 6: DPI, RVPI and TVPI of non-zombie funds 
 
The performance of PE non-zombie funds is superior to that of zombie funds if one 
considers multiples as well as IRR figures. The above table shows that non-zombie 
funds have distributed an average of 74,97 % of committed capital back to the 
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investors. This figure is substantially higher than the modest 41,69 % distributed by 
zombie funds. TVPI of non-zombie funds is also, as expected, larger than the 
equivalent zombie fund value. The non-zombies provided a TVPI of 154,19 % while 
the zombies gave a rate of 114,80 %. This difference of 39,39 % indicates that non-
zombie funds performed significantly better than zombie funds in the period 2003-
2013.  
 
The capital weighted multiple values paint the same picture; non-zombie funds seem 
to perform better and distribute capital earlier on than zombie funds. As for the capital 
weighted IRR values, the gap between zombie fund and non-zombie fund 
performance decreases when capital weighted multiples are taken into account. The 
TVPI difference is now of 18,11 %. To sum up, both equally and capital weighted 
IRRs and multiples lead us to believe that zombie funds perform significantly worse 
than non-zombie PE funds.  
 
IRR and TVPI by vintage year 
Vintage Net IRR(%) TVPI 
2003 10,59 148,42 
2004 -1,09 99,44 
2005 2,83 114,96 
2006 0,68 109,85 
2007 1,70 107,04 
2008 4,23 121,88 
Table 7: Average IRR and TVPI for each vintage year 
 
The above table displays net IRRs and TVPI values for zombies by the different 
vintage years ranging from 2003 to 2008. TVPI is the only multiple included as it 
represents the superior multiple for determining overall fund performance. As evident 
from the figures, TVPI and IRR agree. The best performance is reported by funds 
with vintage years in 2003, while the worst performance is observed for funds started 
in 2004. According to the IRR figures, the second worse return is delivered by funds 
with 2006 vintage, while the TVPI values rank 2007 as the second poorest performing 
vintage year. 2004 is the only year in which negative (average) returns are observed. 
 
Another striking difference between zombie funds and non-zombie funds regards 
average fund size. The average size of the identified zombie funds is, as mentioned 
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earlier, $233,75 mn, while the average size of the non-zombie funds is $534,38 mn. 
Non-zombie funds are thus on average 129 % larger than the zombie funds. We will 
later test for the significance of fund size as a determinant of a fund becoming a 
zombie.  
 
The zombie funds described in this section represent a substantial part of the global 
PE market. Our sample contains 4 204 PE funds, of which 1 274 fulfill the zombie 
fund requirements. Thus, zombie funds constitute 30,30 % of PE funds started 
between 2003 and 2008. Pedersen and Sand (2014) found a similar figure for the 
Nordic PE market. They identified 80 zombie funds in the Nordic region, which 
translates to 30,10 % of the total Nordic market. This suggests that zombie funds 
represent a significant part of the PE market and is an issue where more insight is 
needed.    
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8. Empirical Analysis 
The previous chapter provided a picture of the current zombie funds situation and 
highlighted differences between zombie and non-zombie funds. We will now test for 
significance and direction of the relationships between zombie fund characteristics 
and return. First, we will explore whether fund size, fund type and reaching target 
value impacts the likelihood of becoming a zombie fund. After that we examine 
whether zombie funds underperform other PE funds. The last section will look at 
reporting behavior, i.e. how frequently funds report performance data. Detailed results 
are listed in the appendix.   
   
8.1 Do Zombie Funds Display a Relationship to Fund Size? 
We earlier mentioned that the average size of zombie funds differs from that of non-
zombie funds. Fund size is based on committed capital - which is a constant figure, 
i.e. it is measured by final close of committed capital and is not affected by returns or 
distributions. To determine whether fund size has an impact on the likelihood 
becoming a zombie fund, we look at the 4 204 PE funds included in our sample. 3 901 
funds out of the total sample report size. The data is below divided into seven 
categories distinguished by size. We see that the largest part of zombie funds belong 
to the smallest size categories, as 82,20 % of the zombies are equal to or smaller than 
$300 mn. For the non-zombie funds, 67,20 % are equal to or smaller than $300 mn.  
 
$ mn all funds % of total zombies % of total non-zombies % of total 
0-30 696 17,84 % 247 21,74 % 449 16,24 % 
30-50 343 8,79 % 109 9,60 % 234 8,46 % 
50-100 624 16,00 % 214 18,84 % 410 14,83 % 
100-300 1129 28,94 % 364 32,04 % 765 27,67 % 
300-500 452 11,59 % 100 8,80 % 352 12,73 % 
500-1000 337 8,64 % 62 5,46 % 275 9,95 % 
>1000 320 8,20 % 40 3,52 % 280 10,13 % 
Sum 3901 100,00 % 1136 100,00 % 2765 100,00 % 
not reporting 303 7,77 % 138 12,15 % 165 5,97 % 
Table 8: Fund size categories 
 
A table displaying the different fund size categories by fund type is featured in 
appendix 4. It is evident that the largest parts of VC and early stage zombie funds are 
found in the smaller size categories. 33,33 % of VC zombies are equal to or smaller 
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than $30 mn, while 38,86 % of early stage zombies are equal to or smaller than $30 
mn. For BO funds, most zombies are between $100 and $300 mn in size. This is also 
true for growth zombie funds, where 38,18 % of the funds is found in this middle 
category. The aggregated other fund types also exhibit a size pattern of the majority 
distributed around the middle categories, displaying the same trend as BO and growth 
zombies. This may be an indication that small VC and early stage funds can be extra 
prone to becoming zombie funds. Nevertheless, the size patterns displayed above 
more or less match those for non-zombies and differences should be statistically 
tested for before drawing conclusions.  
 
!
Figure 8: Number of funds in each fund size category 
 
Based on the above diagram, we see that a large portion of the identified zombie 
funds figure on the left side. We label all funds with committed capital of $300 mn or 
less as “small” and funds with capital of $300 mn or more as “large”. This diagram 
indicates that small funds more often turn into zombies than large funds do. 
Positioned on the above figure and the above standing argument, we put forth the 
hypothesis: “Zombie funds tend to be small”. 
 
H0: None of the groups differ in regards to the ratio of zombie funds 
H1: At least one of the groups differ in regards to the ratio of zombie funds  
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To check for statistical significance, a Kruskal-Wallis test has been applied. From the 
test output (see appendix 5), we find that we can reject the null hypothesis that none 
of the groups differ at a 1 % significance level (p-value of 0,01 %). The Kruskal-
Wallis test determines that there is a difference between at least two of the groups, but 
not the direction or size of these differences. An assumption behind this test is that the 
included dependent variable should be measured at the ordinal or continuous level. 
The dependent variable in this case is dichotomous, with one level for zombie funds 
and another for non-zombie funds. We will, therefore, apply a Chi-square test to 
confirm that there is a relationship between the dependent variable and fund size.  
 
The test output of the Chi-square test (see appendix 6) tells us that there is a 
relationship between zombie funds and fund size. We can thus reject the null 
hypothesis of independence between the dependent and independent variable at a 1 % 
significance level (p-value of 0,00 %). The Chi-square test and the Kruskal-Wallis 
test yield the same result. 
 
The next step is to find the direction of the evident differences between the groups, 
which will be done through a logistic regression analysis. A linear multiple regression 
model does not restrict the dependent variable to be between zero and one, and it 
assumes a constant partial effect of the explanatory variables. Therefore, a binary 
response model, such as a logistic regression, is more appropriate in this context 
(Wooldridge, 2009). An outlier is a value that is much smaller or larger than most 
other values in a dataset. Most parametric statistics are highly sensitive to outliers. To 
control for outliers in this model, we have left out all funds larger than $ 5 000 mn.  
 
We expected to find a relationship between the “small” fund size and zombie funds. If 
one looks at figure 8, a ratio of zombie funds to non-zombie funds of approximately 
50 % for the four smallest size categories becomes apparent. The regression analysis 
rendered these four independent variables statistically significant (see appendix 7). 
The regression outcome showed a significant positive relationship between “small” 
funds and zombies. Based on the analysis of this section, we conclude that there is 
* 84*
indeed a relationship between fund size and zombie funds. More specifically, funds 
smaller than $300 mn display a positive relationship with the dependent variable.  
 
8.2 Do Zombie Funds Display a Relationship to Fund Type? 
Table 1 outlines the number of zombie funds and non-zombie funds within the 
different fund types existing in our zombie sample. The ratio of zombie funds and 
non-zombie funds to total funds in each category is also included. Data on fund type 
is reported for all the 4 204 PE funds included in this analysis. All early stage funds 
and VC funds are gathered to represent one group. 
 
The interesting aspect to look at is what portion the zombie funds constitute within 
each category. To determine whether a significant relationship exists between fund 
type and zombie funds, one must consider the relative amount of such funds in each 
group. We see that some fund types are represented by a larger portion of zombie 
funds than other types. Overall, we see a considerable variety in the figures. This 
leads us to believe that fund type may be a contributing factor to the likelihood of a 
fund becoming a zombie. We must therefore test for the statistical significance of this 
relationship. Grounded in these findings we present the following hypothesis: 
“Zombie funds tend to display a relationship to fund type”. 
 
We will first conduct a Kruskal-Wallis and Chi-square test, to see if any significant 
relationship exists between fund types and zombie funds.  
 
H0: None of the fund types differ in regards to the ratio of zombie funds 
H1: At least one of the fund types differ in regards to the ratio of zombie funds 
 
The output of the Kruskal-Wallis test can be found in appendix 8. From the test 
results we can reject the null hypothesis that all categories are the same at a 1 % 
significance level (p-value of 0,01 %). It can thus be concluded that there is a 
statistical significant difference between two or more of the fund type groups.  
 
The Chi-square test yields the same findings and the output can be seen in appendix 9. 
The null hypothesis of independence between the dependent and at least one 
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independent variable can once again be rejected at a 1 % significance level (p-value 
of 0,01 %). Consequently, at least one fund type shows a significant relationship to 
zombie funds.  
 
The nature of this relationship is further explored through a logistic regression model. 
In addition to prove that a relationship exists, it is important to understand the 
direction of it. We expected to find evidence of a relationship between zombie funds 
and fund type, however, none of the fund type variables turned out to be significant 
(see appendix 10). Thus, we do not find evidence regarding which fund types are 
more or less likely to become zombie funds.  
 
8.3. Do Zombie Funds Display a Relationship to whether the Fund has Reached 
Target Value or Not? 
Another aspect that might be interesting to gain insight on is whether it matters if a 
fund reaches its target value or not. A PE fund will have a target value for committed 
capital before cash is raised from investors. Thus, actual committed capital may 
deviate from target committed capital. 2 356 funds in our sample report data on both 
target value and realized capital, while the remaining funds only provide data on 
either committed capital or target capital, or neither. Both figures are required to 
determine if the target is reached. Out of these 2 356 funds, 1 464 actually did reach 
target value. We wish to investigate whether funds that have not reached their target 
value tend to become zombie funds.  
 
H0: β!"#$%!&"'(% = 0 
H1: β!"#$%!&"'(% ≠ 0 
 
A logistic regression is used for this purpose, as the dependent variable is a 
dichotomous variable that either takes the value one or zero, one for zombie and zero 
for non-zombie. An independent variable that represents whether target value is 
reached is included in the model. This independent variable is a dummy variable that 
is one if the target is not reached and zero otherwise.  
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The outcome of the regression model is displayed in appendix 11. We see that the 
‘not reached target value’ variable has a positive coefficient of 0,15, but it is deemed 
not significant. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that β is equal to zero. 
This means that we cannot make any conclusions as to whether not reaching target 
value makes a fund more likely to become a zombie.   
 
R2 is a statistical measure of how close that data are fitted to the regression line. As 
such, it indicates how much of the variability in the dependent variable that is 
explained by the independent variables in the regression. Stata reports pseudo R2 for 
logit regression models, however, the interpretation is similar as for the ordinary R2 
measure. The R2 figures for the above regression models are found in the respective 
appendices. They are found to be quite low which indicates that there are external 
factors missing from the model relating to the zombie variable.  
 
8.4 Do Zombie Funds Underperform other Private Equity Funds? 
This part is that of main focus in this thesis. We will look at two performance 
measures to determine whether zombie funds underperform other PE funds: IRR and 
TVPI. The multiple DPI will also be used to explore this phenomenon. DPI is not a 
direct measure of performance, but it provides information about cash flows and is 
therefore more tangible than IRR and TVPI. Furthermore, DPI demonstrates the 
return investors in these funds have received and is therefore of high interest in this 
context. Each of these measures will be discussed in a separate section before the 
findings are concluded in a brief summary. 
 
8.4.1 IRR 
We earlier found that PE zombie funds recently provided investors with a 
substantially lower internal rate of return than non-zombie PE funds. Note that as our 
sample does not include liquidated funds, all IRR figures are interim. Realized IRR 
can only be calculated for liquidated funds and represents a more credible measure. 
Some concerns have been raised about interim IRR as it is based on an appraisal of 
expected future cash flow. However, research shows that interim IRR has a tendency 
to converge toward finally realized IRR towards fund termination (Burgel, 2000). All 
IRR figures are net of fees.  
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In 2013, zombie cumulative net IRR amounted to 2,56 % while other PE funds 
delivered a cumulative net IRR of 11,84 %. We therefore wish to test whether zombie 
funds are a statistically significant contributing factor to cumulative net IRR, and how 
strong this potential influence might be. We will also look at other significant 
variables affecting the IRR. Grounded in these IRR figures and above argument, we 
expect to find that zombie funds have a negative impact on return.  
 
A generalized least squares (GLS) regression is used to explore this phenomenon. The 
dependent variable in this context is IRR, a continuous variable, making least squares 
regression the appropriate model for analysis. We use panel data for the purpose of 
examining performance. Panel data is a dataset in which variables are observed over 
several time periods, and is as such cross-sectional data measured over time. Ordinary 
least squares regression models, such as the linear multiple regression, ignore the 
panel data structure. A GLS model is thus more appropriate for this purpose as it 
takes into account the covariance matrix. The analysis includes 3 249 observations.  
 
When performing a regression analysis, one should be aware that the constant term 
might vary over time. This is due to a phenomenon called fixed effects and may be 
brought about by instances such as legislative changes, tax changes, technological 
changes or other external influences such as wars or crises. These effects can be 
removed by adding dichotomous variables for time. By applying this technique, we 
have corrected the analysis for such fixed effects. To avoid the fixed effects trap, one 
must include one dichotomous variable less than the time units incorporated in the 
regression model. For example, for five units of time, four dichotomous variables 
must be included to avoid perfect collinearity (Kintel and Knudsen, 2014).  
 
The zombie fund variable is represented by a dummy variable that takes the value one 
if the fund in question is a zombie fund and zero if the fund is not a zombie. The 
regression analysis yielded a zombie coefficient of negative 2,41. We can therefore 
reject the null hypothesis that β!"#$%& is zero at a 1 % significance level (p-value of 
0,00 %). As expected, a strong negative relationship between zombie funds and 
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performance emerged, and zombie funds are negatively related to IRR. This outcome 
is as we predicted and conforms to the IRR statistics earlier discussed in this paper.  
 
We furthermore would like to explore whether poor performance, low IRR, is a 
contributing factor to funds turning zombie. More precisely, it would be interesting to 
test for the existence and strength of an endogenous relationship between these two 
variables. Unfortunately, this was not possible due to limited data. This test would 
require an instrumental variable that is correlated with the zombie variable but not 
correlated with the error term.  
 
X Coeff. (ß) Std. Err.  z-value P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval 
Zombie -2,41 0,34 -7,16 0,00 -3,08 -1,75 
IRR L1.  0,71 0,01 89,74 0,00 0,69 0,73 
R2 0,87           
Table 9: Results of GLS regression – IRR 
 
The outcome of the analysis makes it clear that lagged IRR (L1.) is another factor 
contributing to the variability of the internal rate of return. Lagged IRR is the IRR 
from the previous period. As we are investigating cumulative IRR, it is not surprising 
that time t-1 IRR will influence time t IRR. The test shows a lagged IRR coefficient 
of 0,71 at a 1 % significance level (p-value of 0,00 %). As expected, a positive time t-
1 IRR will have a positive impact on time t IRR.  
 
The above table shows the R2 figures of the regression model. The overall R2 of our 
model is 0,87 meaning that 87,00 % of the variability in the IRR is described by the 
independent variables included. The R2 measure will increase, as other significant 
explanatory variables are included in the model. However, 87,00 % explanatory 
power is very high. This high value might be explained by the inclusion of the lagged 
IRR value. As the IRR is cumulative, it naturally follows that the figure to a large 
degree is explained by values of previous years. Some funds in our sample do not 
update IRR each year, which might enhance this effect. 
 
An additional regression analysis has been executed to further explore the relationship 
between IRR and zombie funds towards the end of their expected lifespan. In the 
context of this model, the dummy variable representing zombie funds only turns one 
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after seven years from vintage. The variable will take the value zero for any year 
previous to this happening, meaning that we now investigate performance after the 
fund has, per definition, turned into a zombie. The same definition for zombie funds 
still apply, but the funds are only included as zombie funds after the passing of seven 
years. We use seven years as it represents the usual threshold for raising successor 
funds. We apply this technique as we wish to explore the isolated impact zombie 
funds have on IRR after they become zombie funds. 
 
X Coeff (ß) Std. Err.  z-value P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval 
Timezombie -0,46 0,24 -1,86 0,06 -0,94 0,02 
IRR L1.  0,93 0,01 130,37 0,00 0,92 0,95 
R2 0,96           
Table 10: Results of GLS regression – IRR and time zombie 
 
Table 10 shows the regression result. The outcome is a negative coefficient of 0,46 at 
a 10 % significance level (p-value of 6,20 %). We once again find a negative 
regression coefficient, meaning that zombie funds tend to negatively impact IRR after 
they per definition can be categorized as zombie funds.  
 
8.4.2 TVPI 
The previous chapter suggested a large difference in the TVPI provided by zombie 
funds and non-zombie funds. We saw that zombie funds provided an average TVPI of 
114,80 % in 2013, while non-zombie funds brought an equivalent rate of 154,19 %. 
These findings support our perception that zombie funds deliver a lower return than 
its non-zombie counterpart. A test will here be performed to check for the statistical 
significance of the relationship between zombie funds and cumulative TVPI, and we 
expect to find a negative relation between the two variables.  
 
TVPI represents the continuous dependent variable in this model. As with IRR, a GLS 
regression model serves as the best fit for exploring the relationship of zombie funds 
and TVPI. We have once again corrected for potential fixed effects to ensure that the 
results are as accurate as possible. The regression includes 6 272 observations. We 
have excluded outliers, as the results are highly sensitive to such values. Therefore, 
funds that display a TVPI above 500 % are removed for the purpose of this analysis.   
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We wish to explore the relationship between the dependent variable TVPI and the 
independent variable zombie funds through this regression model. The zombie fund 
variable is represented by a dummy variable that is one in the case of a zombie and 
zero in the case of a non-zombie. As expected, the test outcome shows a strong 
negative relationship between the two variables (see table 11). We can reject the null 
hypothesis of a β!"#$%& equal to zero, as the zombie coefficient is negative 7,95 at a 1 
% significance level (p-value of 0,00 %). The analysis therefore suggests that the 
zombie fund variable display a significant negative relation to TVPI.  
 
X Coeff (ß) Std. Err.  z-value P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval 
Zombie -7,95 0,94 -8,49 0,00 -9,79 -6,11 
TVPI L1. 0,85 0,01 116,49 0,00 0,84 0,86 
R2 0,81           
Table 11: Results of GLS regression – TVPI 
 
We furthermore find lagged TVPI to be a significant contributing factor to cumulative 
TVPI. Lagged TVPI measures TVPI of the previous period. The lagged TVPI 
coefficient is 0,85 at a 1 % significance level (p-value of 0,00 %), which indicates a 
positive relationship between cumulative TVPI and lagged TVPI.  
 
The previous table shows an overall R2 of 0,8135 for this model. This goes to show 
that 81,35 % of the variability in TVPI is explained by the included independent 
variables. Again, this high value might be explained by the inclusion of the lagged 
TVPI value. As the TVPI is cumulative, it naturally follows that the figure to a large 
degree is explained by values of previous years. Some funds in our sample do not 
update TVPI each year, which might enhance this effect. 
 
A second regression has further been applied to investigate the relationship between 
TVPI and zombie funds towards the end of their expected lifespan. In this model, the 
zombie dummy variable will only take the value one if seven years has passed from a 
fund's creation. The results will shed light on the isolated effect zombie funds have on 
TVPI after they turn into zombies.  
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Table 12 displays the regression findings and we see a negative coefficient of 4,60 at 
a 5 % significance level (p-value of 1,10 %). Based on this outcome we conclude that 
there is indeed a negative relation between TVPI and zombie funds in this setting. 
 
X Coeff (ß) Std. Err.  z-value P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval 
Timezombie -4,60 1,8 -2,55 0,01 -8,13 -1,07 
TVPI L1. 1,03 0,01 108,93 0,00 1,01 1,05 
R2 0,88           
Table 12: Results of GLS regression – TVPI and time zombie 
 
8.4.3 DPI 
It was previously shown that the identified zombie funds have distributed less capital 
to investors than corresponding non-zombie funds. Zombie funds had distributed an 
average of 41,69 % of capital in 2013, while their peers had disbursed 74,97 % of 
cash back to investors. Furthermore, Preqin's performance analyst shows that zombie 
funds have a much lower median distribution to paid-in capital compared to non-
zombie funds (Preqin, 2013b). This leads us to believe that zombie funds may be a 
contributing factor to the amount of capital distributed to investors and we will now 
test for the statistical significance of this relationship. We expect to find a negative 
relationship between zombie funds and disbursed capital.  
 
The dependent variable is represented by the continuous variable cumulative DPI. For 
the same reasons expressed with regards to IRR and TVPI as dependent variables, a 
GLS regression is used. The same technique as earlier is applied to correct for 
potential fixed effects. The number of observations for this model is 4 045. We have 
excluded outliers, as the results are highly sensitive to such values. Therefore, three 
funds are removed from the data as they provide a DPI above 500 %.   
 
The explanatory variable of interest is once again a dummy variable taking the value 
one for zombie funds and zero for non-zombie funds. The results from the regression 
model are displayed in table 13. We find that our expectations are fulfilled as a strong 
negative relationship between DPI and zombies becomes apparent. The zombie 
coefficient turned out to be a negative 3,52. This indicates that the zombie fund 
variable is a negative predictor of the amount of capital distributed back to investors. 
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We therefore reject the null hypothesis that β!"#$%& is zero at a 1 % significance level 
(p-value of 0,00 %)   
 
X Coeff (ß) Std. Err.  z-value P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval 
Zombie -3,52 0,96 -3,67 0,00 -5,39 -1,63 
DPI L1. 0,88 0,01 82,35 0,00 0,86 0,90 
IRR L1.  0,53 0,03 17,21 0,00 0,47 0,59 
R2 0,88           
Table 13: Results of GLS regression – DPI 
 
Another finding is the significant influence that lagged DPI has on the dependent 
variable. Lagged DPI represents last period's DPI. The regression shows a lagged DPI 
coefficient of 0,88 at a 1 % significance level (p-value of 0,00 %), meaning that 
previous distributions affects current cumulative distributions in a positive way. We 
furthermore find that lagged IRR shows a significant positive relationship to DPI. The 
analysis indicates a lagged IRR coefficient of 0,53 at a 1 % significance level (p-value 
of 0,00 %), meaning that last year's IRR affects the amount of cash distributed back to 
investors. We chose to include this last variable, as we believed previous return to 
affect distribution patterns. 
 
Table 13 shows an overall R2 of 0,8809 for this model. This goes to show that 88,09 
% of the variability in DPI is explained by the included independent variables. This 
high value might be explained by the inclusion of the lagged DPI and IRR value. As 
both of these measures are cumulative, it naturally follows that the figures to a large 
degree is explained by values of previous years. Some funds in our sample do not 
update DPI or IRR each year, which might enhance this effect. 
 
A second regression has further been applied to investigate what the relationship 
between DPI and zombie funds looks like after funds reach the end of their expected 
lifespan. The threshold we use to categorize a fund as a zombie is a seven-year 
passing from the fund's inception. Only when funds fulfill these criteria will the 
zombie dummy variable take the value one.  
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X Coeff (ß) Std. Err.  z-value P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval 
Timezombie -4,18 1,52 2,75 0,01 -7,16 -1,19 
DPI L1. 1,11 0,01 96,12 0,00 1,09 1,14 
R2 0,88           
Table 14: Results of GLS regression – DPI and time zombie 
 
The above table tells us that funds meeting the zombie fund definition tend to 
distribute less capital back to investors. We now see that this is also true for the time 
after a fund has turned into a zombie. The regression yields a negative coefficient of 
4,18 at a 1 % significance level (p-value of 0,60 %). This latter coefficient is slightly 
larger than from the previous regression model, meaning that this effect is stronger 
after a fund has met the criteria described above. Since DPI represents actual cash 
outflows to investors, and is thus not subject to manipulation, this finding supports the 
perception that zombie funds provide lower returns than non-zombie funds. However, 
one should be aware that DPI does not consider values left in the fund that will be 
distributed at a potential liquidation.  
 
We further want to investigate whether the relationship between DPI and zombie 
funds differ if we look at each vintage year separately. Longer-lived funds should 
have distributed more capital than shorter-lived funds. By comparing zombie and 
non-zombie funds of the same vintage, we only study funds of the same age. We run 
GLS regressions for each vintage year from 2003 to 2008, and the results are 
displayed in table 15 (The results of each regression model are also found in 
appendices 18 to 23): 
 
Vintage 
Coeff 
(ß) 
Std. 
Err.  z-value P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval R2 
2003 -10,68 10,72 -1,00 0,32 -31,69 10,32 0,33 
2004 -36,38 9,00 -4,04 0,00 -54,02 -18,75 0,30 
2005 -18,12 6,17 -2,94 0,00 -30,22 -6,03 0,24 
2006 -13,85 3,81 -3,64 0,00 -21,31 -6,40 0,30 
2007 -19,89 3,76 -5,29 0,00 -27,26 -12,52 0,22 
2008 -12,75 4,28 -2,98 0,00 -21,15 -4,36 0,17 
Table 15: Results of GLS regression – DPI for each vintage year 
 
We find zombie funds for all vintage years included in our sample to display a 
negative relation to DPI except for 2003. We now observe stronger negative 
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relationships between zombie funds and DPI than in the previous models. The reason 
for this is that lagged values for DPI and IRR are excluded, and the effect of these 
lagged values may to some degree be incorporated in the zombie coefficients. Based 
on this analysis, we conclude that there is indeed a negative relation between zombie 
funds and DPI for each of the included vintage years, except for 2003 where the 
negative relationship is found to be insignificant. 
 
We will now look at the development of DPI for possible patterns. None of the funds 
included in our sample are liquidated and so we cannot say whether zombie funds 
return less than was originally committed by the investor. We can, however, explore 
if DPI of zombie funds follow a different development than DPI of non-zombie funds. 
We expect the change in DPI to reflect the above found results. We forecast to find 
that zombie funds on average display a slower increase in DPI than non-zombie 
funds. Outliers are excluded for the purpose of this analysis, and all funds displaying 
a change in DPI above 200 % are removed.  
 
Average change in DPI 
Zombies 19,94 % 
Non-zombies 29,78 % 
Table 16: Average change in DPI for zombie funds and non-zombie funds 
 
Table 16 shows the mean increase in DPI each year for the funds included in our 
sample. Zombie funds display an average change in DPI of 19,94 % each year, while 
non-zombie funds show an average increase in DPI of 29,78 % each year. Based on 
these figures, we wish to test whether there exists a significant relationship between 
the development of DPI and zombie funds. 
 
We test for the significance of this relationship by applying a regression analysis with 
change in DPI as the dependent variable. The model (see appendix 25) yields a 
regression coefficient of negative 0,10. We therefore reject the null hypothesis at a 1 
% significance level (p-value of 0,00 %) and conclude that zombie funds deliver a 
slower growth in DPI than non-zombie funds. Appendix 26 shows the result for a 
similar regression but where the zombie dummy only takes value one once a fund is 
seven years old. The outcome provides comparable insight with a regression 
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coefficient of negative 0,09 at a 1 % significance level (p-value of 0,20 %). Meaning 
that if we isolate the effect zombie funds have on the development of DPI after they 
turn into zombies, we observe the same inferior change.  
 
We further wish to examine whether the relationship between zombie funds and the 
DPI development differ for each vintage year separately. Longer-lived funds will 
presumably have lower change in DPI per year. By comparing zombie funds and non-
zombie funds of the same vintage years, we compare DPI development for funds of 
the same age. We run GLS regressions for each vintage year from 2003 to 2008, and 
the results are displayed in table 17 (The results of each regression model are also 
found in appendices 27 to 32): 
 
Vintage Coeff (ß) Std. Err.  z-value P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval R2 
2003 -0,14 0,06 -2,33 0,02 -0,26 -0,02 0,11 
2004 -0,11 0,04 -2,67 0,01 -0,19 -0,03 0,09 
2005 -0,01 0,03 -0,35 0,72 -0,08 0,05 0,09 
2006 -0,06 0,04 -1,33 0,19 -0,15 0,03 0,11 
2007 -0,10 0,06 -1,66 0,10 -0,22 0,02 0,07 
2008 -0,12 0,06 -1,91 0,06 -0,24 0,00 0,08 
Table 17: Results of GLS regression – Change in DPI for each vintage year 
 
We find negative relations between zombie funds and DPI development for all 
vintage years. However, 2005 and 2006 are found to be not significant. Based on this 
regression model, we conclude that zombie funds started in 2003, 2004, 2007 and 
2008 deliver a slower growth in DPI than non-zombie funds with corresponding 
vintage years. 
 
8.4.4 Summary 
The main purpose of this section has been to investigate the relationship between 
zombie funds and return to investors. We have evaluated performance in the form of 
IRR, DPI and TVPI. Albeit DPI not being a direct performance measure, it is included 
as it provides insight on cash flows. Both IRR and TVPI are measures that can be 
manipulated. For this reason, and the fact that we do not have access to any of the 
underlying cash flows, we focus on DPI to gain as much information as possible. Our 
expectations were that zombie funds would display lower returns. The results of the 
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several regression models show a similar result: zombie funds exhibit a strong 
negative relationship to all the return indicators included. The regression analysis 
applied to investigate the relationship between zombie funds and return indicators 
after funds turn into zombies also show negative relationships. Specifically, the DPI 
coefficient turned out to be more negative in this case, and so the negative impact that 
zombie funds have on DPI is stronger after a fund can be said to fulfill the zombie 
fund criteria. Furthermore, we found zombie funds to display a slower development 
of DPI than its non-zombie peers. Our findings are strengthened by tests yielding 
similar results for all vintage years.  
 
It is important to emphasize that we cannot prove a causal relationships between any 
variables through a regression analysis. For instance, we cannot conclude that being a 
zombie fund will definitely lead to poor returns. It might be poor returns that lead a 
fund to becoming a zombie. However, what can be concluded from the regression is 
the strength and direction of the proven significant quantitative relationships. It would 
be interesting to explore the existence and strength of endogenous relationships 
between zombie funds and the different performance measures, i.e. if the performance 
affects the probability of becoming a zombie. As already mentioned, this could not be 
done in this thesis due to limited data. 
 
As performance data is reported to Preqin on a voluntary basis, our dataset contains 
less information than optimal. This also explains the differences in the number of 
observations in each regression model. Furthermore, voluntary reporting leads to a 
non random-sample and measures such as IRR and TVPI have several drawbacks. 
One should thus be careful about inferring conclusions based on the previous analysis, 
although it provides a good overview of the current situation. 
 
8.5 Do Zombie Funds Report Performance Data Less Frequently than Non-
Zombie Funds? 
It has earlier been discussed that poor performing funds have less incentive to report 
performance data than well performing funds. One reason for this is that reporting 
unsatisfactory returns can lower the changes for raising successor funds. As we found 
zombie funds to underperform other PE funds, it is reasonable to believe that zombie 
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funds will have less incentive to report performance and thus report data less 
frequently to Preqin and other databases. We will now explore whether the identified 
zombie funds in our sample tend to report performance data less frequently than non-
zombie funds.  
 
We look at IRR and DPI, and the frequency to which these measures are reported to 
Preqin. The following table gives summary statistics of how often zombie funds and 
non-zombie funds on average reported IRR and DPI during the time-period of our 
sample. 
 
Average times reported 
  IRR DPI 
All 1,36 2,05 
Zombie 0,95 1,48 
Non-zombie 1,54 2,29 
Table 18: Average number of times performance data is reported 
 
It is evident from table 18 that the zombie funds in our sample reported both IRR and 
DPI less frequently than non-zombie funds did. We will now test for statistical 
significance of the relation between reporting and zombie funds. OLS regression 
models are used for this purpose. Two models are applied, one with reported IRR as 
dependent variable and one with reported DPI as dependent variable. We have 
included dummy variables to control for the effects fund size, vintage year and fund 
types may have on the dependent variable. The results are summarized in table 19, 
and complete regression-outputs can be found in appendices 33 and 34. 
 
Reported Coeff (ß) Std. Err.  z-value P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval R2 
IRR -0,40 0,07 -5,71 0,00 -0,54 -0,27 0,15 
DPI -0,55 0,10 -5,53 0,00 -0,75 -0,36 0,16 
 Table 19: Results of OLS regression – Reported IRR and DPI 
 
The regression results are as expected as we find negative relations between zombie 
funds and the number of times both IRR and DPI are reported. The model yields 
regression coefficients of negative 0,40 and 0,55. We therefore reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients are equal to zero at a 1 % significance level (p-values 
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of 0,00 %) and conclude that zombie funds report IRR and DPI less frequently than 
non-zombie funds. 
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9. Conclusion 
We have looked at PE zombie and non-zombie funds in the global PE market based 
on data from Preqin. The research question of this thesis is: “Do zombie fund 
performance and other characteristics differ from those of other private equity funds 
globally?” Out of 4 204 funds in our dataset, we identified 1 274 zombie funds. We 
will now summarize our findings before we offer suggestions for further research. 
 
We distinguished all funds into seven different size categories to examine the 
relationship between zombie funds and fund size. Our findings suggest a significant 
positive relation between zombie funds and fund size below $300 mn (classified as 
small funds). We therefore conclude that zombie funds tend to be small. 
 
We also looked at whether zombie funds tend to display a relation to certain fund 
types. None of our included fund types turned out to exhibit significant relationships 
to zombie funds. Thus, we do not find evidence regarding which fund types are more 
or less likely to become zombie funds. 
 
Further, we investigated the existence of a relation between zombie funds and funds 
that did not reach target value. We did find a positive regression coefficient of 0,15, 
which was, however, deemed not significant. No conclusions can be made regarding 
whether not reaching target value makes a fund more likely to become a zombie.  
 
To answer whether zombie funds underperform other PE funds, we looked at the 
performance measures IRR and TVPI. Both of these measures displayed a significant 
negative relation to zombie funds, indicating that zombie funds do in fact 
underperform other PE funds. We furthermore tested for the isolated effect of the 
same relationship towards the end of a fund's lifetime and found similar results.  
 
The DPI multiple received considerable focus as it is based on cash distributions and 
therefore is less exposed to manipulation. We once again found a negative relation 
between distributions and zombie funds, and conclude that zombie funds are a 
negative predictor of the capital amount distributed back to investors. This relation 
also holds for funds near the end of their expected lifespan. We moreover investigated 
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this relationship in more detail by looking at each vintage from 2003 to 2008 
separately. Zombie funds for all the vintage years included in our sample displayed a 
negative relation to DPI, except for 2003 where the regression coefficient was 
negative, but not significant. Additionally, we examined the development of DPI for 
zombie and non-zombie funds. Based on our findings, we conclude that zombies 
deliver a slower growth in DPI than non-zombies. We observe the same inferior 
change in DPI for zombie funds when looking at funds near the end of their expected 
lifespan in isolation. Similar results are found when each vintage year is investigated 
separately, except for 2005 and 2006 where the results are found to be insignificant.  
 
Lastly, after finding evidence of zombie underperformance, we looked at whether 
zombie funds tend to report performance data less frequently than non-zombie funds. 
For this purpose, we included the number of times IRR and DPI was reported to 
Preqin. The results were as expected, and we conclude that zombie funds report IRR 
and DPI less frequently than non-zombie funds. 
 
Our general conclusion is that zombie funds underperform other funds in the global 
PE market. The fact that we identified 30,30 % of the funds in our dataset as zombie 
funds, leads us believe that this topic should be of high interest. We propose the 
following points for further study. 
 
9.1 Suggestions for Further Research 
• It would be interesting to look at the endogeneity of the relationships found in 
this thesis. For example, one could investigate whether poor performance 
leads to a fund becoming a zombie. Such analyses may provide insight on the 
direction of the relationships found above.  
• Due to limited data, our dataset only contains active funds. It would be 
interesting to look at realized performance and distributions for liquidated 
funds. 
• We mentioned briefly that there might be reputational effects of being 
involved in the management of zombie funds. What reputational effects that 
can be found and their possible ramifications could be a topic for further 
investigation.  
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• It would be intriguing to look at potential changes in the GP team before and 
after a fund turns into a zombie fund. One could investigate if and how the 
investment team changes after a fund can be defined as a zombie fund.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Overview of average fund size by fund type 
Value/committed capital ($ mn)  
  Obs Mean 
  Non-zombies zombies Non-zombies Zombies 
All 2765 1136 534,38 233,75 
Balanced 68 29 327,41 1021,88 
Buyout 872 267 1028,90 403,12 
Co-investment 59 13 267,01 283,93 
Distressed Debt 79 8 1356,14 689,90 
Early Stage 257 131 136,84 99,32 
Early Stage: Seed 65 46 100,08 48,39 
Early Stage: Start-up 63 34 93,48 48,52 
All Early Stage 385 211 123,54 80,03 
Expansion/Late Stage 88 65 168,09 135,36 
Growth 279 110 280,60 181,69 
Infrastructure -   -   
Mezzanine 173 48 457,82 284,96 
Natural Resources 73 20 989,09 433,28 
Real Estate 1 - 137,23 - 
Special Situations 58 19 386,82 356,32 
Timber 23 6 275,76 280,33 
Turnaround 41 7 379,75 213,61 
Venture (General) 548 329 170,77 123,57 
Venture Debt 18 4 282,86 111,31 
All venture 566 333 174,33 123,42 
 
 
Appendix 2: Overview of GP location 
GP Location Zombies Non-Zombies 
Argentina 1 0,1 % 4 0,1 % 
Australia 33 2,6 % 45 1,5 % 
Austria 7 0,5 % 8 0,3 % 
Bahamas 3 0,2 % 0 0,0 % 
Bahrain 3 0,2 % 5 0,2 % 
Bangladesh 1 0,1 % 0 0,0 % 
Barbados 0 0,0 % 1 0,0 % 
Belgium 4 0,3 % 12 0,4 % 
Bermuda 3 0,2 % 0 0,0 % 
Botswana 0 0,0 % 1 0,0 % 
Brazil 8 0,6 % 21 0,7 % 
British Virgin 
Islands 1 0,1 % 0 0,0 % 
Bulgaria 1 0,1 % 2 0,1 % 
Cambodia 0 0,0 % 1 0,0 % 
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GP Location Zombies Non-Zombies 
Canada 37 2,9 % 83 2,8 % 
Cayman Islands 1 0,1 % 1 0,0 % 
Chile 1 0,1 % 5 0,2 % 
China 30 2,4 % 90 3,1 % 
Colombia 0 0,0 % 3 0,1 % 
Costa Rica 0 0,0 % 2 0,1 % 
Croatia 0 0,0 % 2 0,1 % 
Czech Republic 0 0,0 % 2 0,1 % 
Denmark 8 0,6 % 22 0,8 % 
Egypt 7 0,5 % 9 0,3 % 
El Salvador 0 0,0 % 1 0,0 % 
Estonia 1 0,1 % 2 0,1 % 
Fiji 1 0,1 % 0 0,0 % 
Finland 20 1,6 % 25 0,9 % 
France 35 2,7 % 128 4,4 % 
Germany 33 2,6 % 47 1,6 % 
Ghana 2 0,2 % 0 0,0 % 
Greece 5 0,4 % 4 0,1 % 
Guernsey 0 0,0 % 1 0,0 % 
Hong Kong 17 1,3 % 57 1,9 % 
Hungary 4 0,3 % 3 0,1 % 
Iceland 1 0,1 % 3 0,1 % 
India 19 1,5 % 56 1,9 % 
Iraq 0 0,0 % 1 0,0 % 
Ireland 4 0,3 % 6 0,2 % 
Israel 19 1,5 % 34 1,2 % 
Italy 27 2,1 % 38 1,3 % 
Jamaica 0 0,0 % 1 0,0 % 
Japan 29 2,3 % 104 3,5 % 
Jersey 2 0,2 % 3 0,1 % 
Jordan 2 0,2 % 1 0,0 % 
Kazakhstan 6 0,5 % 3 0,1 % 
Kenya 1 0,1 % 1 0,0 % 
Kuwait 11 0,9 % 3 0,1 % 
Latvia 3 0,2 % 1 0,0 % 
Lebanon 0 0,0 % 1 0,0 % 
Luxembourg 8 0,6 % 10 0,3 % 
Macau 1 0,1 % 0 0,0 % 
Malaysia 5 0,4 % 11 0,4 % 
Mauritius 4 0,3 % 8 0,3 % 
Mexico 3 0,2 % 5 0,2 % 
Morocco 5 0,4 % 7 0,2 % 
Nepal 1 0,1 % 0 0,0 % 
Netherlands 20 1,6 % 37 1,3 % 
New Zealand 2 0,2 % 11 0,4 % 
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GP Location Zombies Non-Zombies 
Nigeria 1 0,1 % 1 0,0 % 
Norway 13 1,0 % 32 1,1 % 
Pakistan 0 0,0 % 1 0,0 % 
Panama 2 0,2 % 0 0,0 % 
Peru 2 0,2 % 3 0,1 % 
Philippines 0 0,0 % 2 0,1 % 
Poland 5 0,4 % 10 0,3 % 
Portugal 2 0,2 % 13 0,4 % 
Puerto Rico 1 0,1 % 0 0,0 % 
Romania 0 0,0 % 1 0,0 % 
Russia 20 1,6 % 14 0,5 % 
Rwanda 0 0,0 % 1 0,0 % 
Samoa 1 0,1 % 0 0,0 % 
Saudi Arabia 2 0,2 % 6 0,2 % 
Senegal 1 0,1 % 0 0,0 % 
Sierra Leone 0 0,0 % 1 0,0 % 
Singapore 10 0,8 % 24 0,8 % 
Slovakia 4 0,3 % 0 0,0 % 
Slovenia 0 0,0 % 1 0,0 % 
South Africa 23 1,8 % 22 0,8 % 
South Korea 7 0,5 % 87 3,0 % 
Spain 32 2,5 % 30 1,0 % 
Sri Lanka 0 0,0 % 2 0,1 % 
Sweden 10 0,8 % 28 1,0 % 
Switzerland 11 0,9 % 32 1,1 % 
Taiwan 8 0,6 % 16 0,5 % 
Tajikistan 1 0,1 % 0 0,0 % 
Thailand 1 0,1 % 1 0,0 % 
Togo 0 0,0 % 1 0,0 % 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 0 0,0 % 1 0,0 % 
Tunisia 1 0,1 % 4 0,1 % 
Turkey 0 0,0 % 3 0,1 % 
UK 78 6,1 % 231 7,9 % 
US 581 45,6 % 1400 47,8 % 
Uganda 0 0,0 % 1 0,0 % 
Ukraine 3 0,2 % 2 0,1 % 
United Arab 
Emirates 11 0,9 % 19 0,6 % 
Uruguay 1 0,1 % 0 0,0 % 
Vietnam 2 0,2 % 8 0,3 % 
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Appendix 3: Overview of industry focus 
Industry Focus Zombie Non-Zombies 
Agriculture & Environment 22 1,8 % 61 2,1 % 
Communication & Telecom 60 4,8 % 111 3,8 % 
Consumer & Retail 58 4,6 % 162 5,6 % 
Diversified 624 49,9 % 1550 53,7 % 
Energy 46 3,7 % 136 4,7 % 
Finance 17 1,4 % 62 2,1 % 
Health & Biotechnology 144 11,5 % 238 8,2 % 
IT & Technology 229 18,3 % 449 15,6 % 
Industrial 47 3,8 % 100 3,5 % 
Other 4 0,3 % 17 0,6 % 
Sum 1251   2886   
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Appendix 4: Fund size categories by fund type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
$ mn zombies % of total non-zombies % of total 
Buyout         
0-30 17 6,37 % 47 5,39 % 
30-50 16 5,99 % 40 4,59 % 
50-100 37 13,86 % 91 10,44 % 
100-300 99 37,08 % 256 29,36 % 
300-500 42 15,73 % 137 15,71 % 
500-1000 30 11,24 % 125 14,33 % 
>1000 26 9,74 % 176 20,18 % 
  267 100,00 % 872 100,00 % 
Venture         
0-30 111 33,33 % 145 25,62 % 
30-50 36 10,81 % 69 12,19 % 
50-100 60 18,02 % 113 19,96 % 
100-300 92 27,63 % 137 24,20 % 
300-500 25 7,51 % 62 10,95 % 
500-1000 8 2,40 % 31 5,48 % 
>1000 1 0,30 % 9 1,59 % 
  333 100,00 % 566 100,00 % 
Early Stage         
0-30 82 38,86 % 136 34,61 % 
30-50 28 13,27 % 45 11,45 % 
50-100 44 20,85 % 67 17,05 % 
100-300 53 25,12 % 95 24,17 % 
300-500 3 1,42 % 30 7,63 % 
500-1000 1 0,47 % 11 2,80 % 
>1000 0 0,00 % 9 2,29 % 
  211 100,00 % 393 100,00 % 
Growth         
0-30 15 13,64 % 36 12,90 % 
30-50 10 9,09 % 26 9,32 % 
50-100 27 24,55 % 54 19,35 % 
100-300 42 38,18 % 92 32,97 % 
300-500 11 10,00 % 29 10,39 % 
500-1000 3 2,73 % 28 10,04 % 
>1000 2 1,82 % 14 5,02 % 
  110 100,00 % 279 100,00 % 
Other         
0-30 22 10,23 % 85 12,82 % 
30-50 19 8,84 % 54 8,14 % 
50-100 46 21,40 % 85 12,82 % 
100-300 78 36,28 % 185 27,90 % 
300-500 19 8,84 % 94 14,18 % 
500-1000 20 9,30 % 80 12,07 % 
>1000 11 5,12 % 80 12,07 % 
  215 100,00 % 663 100,00 % 
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Appendix 5: Kruskal-Wallis test for fund size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 6: Chi-squared test for fund size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
probability =     0.0001
chi-squared with ties =   134.176 with 7 d.f.
probability =     0.0001
chi-squared =    85.017 with 7 d.f.
                             
       7    320   553040.00  
       6    337   624197.50  
       5    452   872606.00  
                             
       4   1129    2.42e+06  
       3    624    1.36e+06  
       2    343   731784.50  
       1    696    1.54e+06  
       0    303   734122.50  
                             
    size    Obs    Rank Sum  
                             
Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test
          Pearson chi2(7) = 134.2086   Pr = 0.000
     Total         303        696        343        624      1,129        452        337        320       4,204 
                                                                                                               
         1         138        247        109        214        364        100         62         40       1,274 
         0         165        449        234        410        765        352        275        280       2,930 
                                                                                                               
    Zombie           0          1          2          3          4          5          6          7       Total
                                                      size
* 113*
Appendix 7: Results of logit regression - fund size 
 
Dependent variable: zombie 
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Appendix 8: Kruskal-Wallis test for fund types 
 
 . 
probability =     0.0001
chi-squared with ties =   124.623 with 14 d.f.
probability =     0.0001
chi-squared =    78.964 with 14 d.f.
                                 
          15   1000    2.27e+06  
          14     50    87989.00  
          13     42    76265.00  
          12     86   168073.00  
          11      1     1465.50  
                                 
          10     96   184830.00  
           9    233   450765.50  
           8      1     3567.50  
           7    417   863353.50  
           6    164   387482.00  
                                 
           5    657    1.47e+06  
           4     94   156675.00  
           3     77   142271.50  
           2   1185    2.35e+06  
           1    101   217381.50  
                                 
    testtype    Obs    Rank Sum  
                                 
Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test
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Appendix 9: Chi-squared test for fund types 
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Appendix 10: Results of logit regression – fund types 
 
Dependent variable: zombie 
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Appendix 11: Results of logit regression – target value  
 
Dependent variable: Zombie 
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Appendix 12: Results of GLS regression – IRR 
 
Dependent variable: IRR 
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Appendix 13: Results of GLS regression – IRR and time zombie 
 
Dependent variable: IRR 
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Appendix 14: Results of GLS regression – TVPI 
 
Dependent variable: TVPI 
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Appendix 15: Results of GLS regression – TVPI and time zombie 
 
Dependent variable TVPI 
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Appendix 16: Results of GLS regression – DPI 
 
Dependent variable: DPI 
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Appendix 17: Results of GLS regression – DPI and time zombie 
 
Dependent variable: DPI 
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Appendix 18: Results of GLS regression – DPI for vintage 2003 
 
Dependent variable: DPI
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Appendix 19: Results of GLS regression – DPI for vintage 2004 
 
Dependent variable: DPI 
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Appendix 20: Results of GLS regression – DPI for vintage 2005 
 
Dependent variable: DPI 
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Appendix 21: Results of GLS regression – DPI for vintage 2006 
 
Dependent variable: DPI 
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Appendix 22: Results of GLS regression – DPI for vintage 2007 
 
Dependent variable: DPI 
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Appendix 23: Results of GLS regression – DPI for vintage 2008 
 
Dependent variable: DPI 
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Appendix 24: Average change in DPI for zombie funds and non-zombie funds 
 
Zombies 
 
 
Non-zombies 
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Appendix 25: Results of GLS regression – Change in DPI 
 
Dependent variable: change in DPI 
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Appendix 26: Results of GLS regression – Change in DPI and time zombie 
 
Dependent variable change in DPI 
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Appendix 27: Results of GLS regression – Change in DPI for vintage 2003 
 
Dependent variable: Change in DPI 
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Appendix 28: Results of GLS regression – Change in DPI for vintage 2004 
 
Dependent variable: Change in DPI 
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Appendix 29: Results of GLS regression – Change in DPI for vintage 2005 
 
Dependent variable: Change in DPI 
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Appendix 30: Results of GLS regression – Change in DPI for vintage 2006 
 
Dependent variable: Change in DPI 
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Appendix 31: Results of GLS regression – Change in DPI for vintage 2007 
 
Dependent variable: Change in DPI 
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Appendix 32: Results of GLS regression – Change in DPI for vintage 2008 
 
Dependent variable: Change in DPI 
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Appendix 33: Results of OLS regression – Reported IRR 
 
Dependent variable: Reported IRR 
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Appendix 34: Results of OLS regression – Reported DPI 
 
Dependent variable: Reported DPI 
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Appendix 35: Private Equity Glossary  
 
• Buyout - A transaction in which a company is acquired from the current 
shareholders. 
• Carried Interest - Compensation received by a PE fund’s management team 
once the investor’s have received repayment of their original investment in the 
fund plus a specified hurdle rate. Carried interest is typically up to 20 % of 
fund profits, while the hurdle rate is usually around 8 %.  
• Committed Capital - The contributed capital that was initially raised 
(committed by investors), which has been drawn down in the PE fund. 
• Dependent Variable - A variable in a functional relation whose value is 
dependent upon the values of other (independent) variables in the relation. 
• DPI - A measure of the cumulative distributions returned to investors as a 
proportion of the cumulative paid-in capital. 
• Early Stage Fund - PE funds focused on investing in companies at the early 
part of their lives. 
• Fund Size - The total amount of capital committed to a fund. 
• General Partner - A partner in a PE management company that who is 
responsible for managing the investments within the PE fund. 
• Independent Variable - A variable in a functional relation whose value is not 
dependent upon the values of other variables in the relation. 
• Growth Capital - Investments in relatively mature companies that are looking 
for capital to aid growth, restructuring or entering new markets. 
• IRR - The internal rate of return. This rate represents the net return earned by 
investors from the fund’s activity from fund inception to a stated date. 
• Limited Partner - An investor that the investment team (GP) of a PE fund 
raises capital from. These are often institutional investors such as pension 
funds, universities, insurance companies, foundations, endowments and high 
net worth individuals.  
• Management Fees - Compensation received by a PE fund’s management team. 
This fee is charged annually and is equal to a given percentage of the 
investor’s initial capital commitment to the fund. 
• Paid-in Capital - The amount of committed capital that investors have actually 
transferred to a fund. 
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• Regression Coefficient - The constant that represents the rate of change of one 
variable (dependent) as a function of changes in another variable 
(independent). 
• RVPI - A measure of the current value of remaining investments within a fund 
in proportion to cumulative paid-in capital. 
• TVPI - A measure of the current value of remaining investments within a fund 
plus the total value of all distributions to date, in proportion to cumulative 
paid-in capital.  
• Venture Capital - Professional equity co-invested with the entrepreneur of the 
target company to fund early stage or expansion venture. 
• Vintage year - The year when the first incursion of investment capital is 
delivered to a portfolio company. This is when capital is first distributed by 
the PE fund to a company, which is drawn down from the investors. The 
vintage year is the year in which the fund was raised. The vintage year can 
differ from the fundraising launch date. 
 
